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ABSTRACT 
 
During situations of armed conflict, United Nations (UN) agencies have been 
consistently faced with challenges to access vulnerable populations in order to fulfill 
their humanitarian mandates. This is particularly true in countries such as Yemen, 
Libya, and Ukraine who have faced prolonged conflict situations from as early as 
2010. During these conflicts, UN agencies have been frequently unable to enter areas 
that are controlled by non-state armed groups. There are several legitimate reasons for 
these access challenges, one of which includes the inadequate legal framework that 
governs non-state armed groups. This is not to neglect the operational and executive 
ineffectiveness of the UN or the political dynamics that shape these conflicts. In fact, 
this paper argues that these aspects complement the insufficiencies that are witnessed 
within the international legal system. The ineffectiveness of the UN, which is 
ultimately driven by the political interests of states, have not only been part and parcel 
to the genesis and influx of non-state armed groups in the respective countries, but 
have also played a major role in maintaining the legal positioning of non-state armed 
groups as a byproduct of the international system rather than main actors. The paper 
maintains that non-state armed groups have become significant players in 
international relations due to their increase in regional power and ability to affect 
politics. With this reality, the current legal framework that governs non-state armed 
groups has been proven to be an insufficient mechanism of enabling the interaction 
between UN agencies and non-state armed groups. In an attempt to ease such an 
interaction, the paper proposes some legal reforms, which are based on findings that 
prove the inconsistencies of that legal framework. It also offers policy suggestions for 
operational reforms within the UN system to facilitate the efficient implementation of 
the legal reforms.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations was founded on a mandate of maintaining international peace and 
security. Within that mandate, there exists a diversity of activities that the United 
Nations (UN) undertakes ranging from facilitating peacemaking processes between 
states and combatting poverty. In that light, some UN agencies build their emergency 
operations on a humanitarian mandate, which is based on supporting populations in 
need through the distribution of aid. Other agencies have the intent of raising 
awareness about global issues while some are based on creating dialogue between 
states and other entities. Those that have the mandate to distribute humanitarian aid to 
populations in need, specifically in conflict situations, are now facing increased 
challenges in fulfilling that purpose.  
The dynamics of global conflicts in the recent decade have proven to be more 
complex than conventional warfare. The current refugee crisis, the use of 
unconventional weaponry, and the increased presence of non-state actors in regions 
such as the Middle East and Eastern Europe have all contributed to the complexity of 
armed conflicts, specifically due to the influx of transnational armed groups.1 These 
factors have posed significant obstacles for UN agencies and have brought about 
challenges to the scope within which they operate.  
One of the obstacles that UN agencies face due to the current state of conflicts 
is the high level of security risks for staff deployed in conflict areas. Recent efforts 
have been made by UN agencies to increase security precautions for staff members on 
                                                 
1 See Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal 
Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J TRANS LAW 1, (2004). Berman argues that 
although the identity of actors may change over time, historically, the issue of non-
state actors has always shaped the laws of war. Their identities and labels may change 
over time, from the native to the rebel to the unlawful combatant and the nature of 
wars may change too, from the frontier wars to the war on terror, but the structure of 
legal argument was always responsive to the issue of non-state actors. However, what 
is now becoming a norm is the ‘transnational’ nature of armed conflict in light of the 
growing power and resources of non-state armed groups. Therefore, although Berman 
discusses the adaptive nature of international law to the malleable nature of non-state 
actors and war, the transnational nature of armed groups has now become a 
component of adaptation that international law is yet to adapt to. See generally Marco 
Sassòli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law, 6 HPCR 
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, 25 – 28, (2006). The idea of ‘transnational’ armed 
conflicts will be further discussed in the legal analysis of this paper.  
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mission, although the risks are still undeniable. Another challenge that UN agencies 
face is the terms and conditions imposed by donors when a sum is given to a UN 
agency to fulfill a humanitarian goal.2 Conflicts of interest arise when donors restrict 
the use of funds to a particular region and may limit the agency’s interaction with 
particular groups or states.3 UN agencies have been attempting to work around some 
of these challenges, albeit with some difficulty, by negotiating certain terms in order 
to expand their ability to interact with certain groups and enter certain regions to 
distribute aid to their populations. There are also situations where UN agencies have 
preferred taking loans from other countries or organizations that are less restrictive so 
as to attend to the needs for populations more freely.4  
However, the primary challenge that this paper discusses is the access 
challenges that UN agencies face in particular areas within a state or region, whether 
they are controlled by the government or by non-state armed groups.5 Access to non-
government controlled areas (NGCAs)6 has proven to be the more pressing challenge 
for UN agencies, particularly when the UN agency is required to request access from 
a non-state armed group, which involves an elongated process of negotiations. Such a 
process poses further challenges on UN agencies.  
In order to successfully examine these access challenges, it is important to 
introduce the context under which UN agencies face access issues. Since the eruption 
of the Arab Spring in 2011, UN agencies have been attempting to attend to the needs 
of affected populations. This is especially significant with the influx or emergence of 
                                                 
2 Examples of humanitarian goals include, but are not limited to, distributing food, 
providing health care services, and providing protection for migrants and refugees. 
3 Claudia McGoldrick, The Future of Humanitarian Action: An ICRC Perspective, 93 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 965, 974 – 975, (2011). 
4 Information on the funding practices of the United Nations can be found here, 
ROMESH MUTTUKUMARU, THE FUNDING AND RELATED PRACTICES OF THE UN 
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM, (May 2015), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/qcpr/pdf/ie_muttukumaru_paper_funding.pdf.  
5 The term “non-state actors” refers to all actors within a state that are not affiliated 
with any state entity. This includes, but is not limited to, non-governmental 
organizations, civil society, corporations, and non-state armed groups. For the 
purposes of this research, the term will be limited to non-state armed groups in order 
to illustrate the challenges that are faced by UN agencies due to the presence of non-
state armed groups in conflict areas and their control over certain regions.   
6 Non-government controlled areas (NGCAs) is in reference to areas or regions within 
a state that are controlled by non-state armed groups such as rebel groups or 
opposition forces. This is in contrast with government controlled areas (GCAs). 
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non-state armed groups caused by civil unrest in the region. The contexts of Yemen, 
Libya, and Ukraine will be outlined in order to illustrate the severity of the access 
constraints faced by UN agencies as a result of non-state armed groups’ control over 
certain areas of land. Limiting the countries focused on to Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine 
is because UN agencies, and their local nongovernmental partners, have become the 
primary humanitarian actors in these countries as a result of the severity of their 
conflicts.7 This paper does not aim to provide a complete account of the obstacles 
faced by UN agencies, but rather it aims to exemplify the access challenges that the 
current legal framework poses on such agencies in these areas. Adding Ukraine to the 
cases discussed benefits the research in providing an account of a non-Arab country 
that faced a similar uprising but is outside the region. Thus, the purpose of providing 
this example is to show that the impediments faced by UN agencies are not restricted 
to the Middle East.  
UN agencies’ access challenges can be attributed to a plethora of factors. The 
primary factor that this paper intends to discuss is the insufficiencies imbedded within 
the legal framework governing non-state armed groups under which the UN operates. 
This is the common factor that is observed when examining the context under which 
access challenges are faced. It can be argued that the said obstacles are a result of the 
gaps in the current legal framework that governs non-state armed groups under the 
law of armed conflict, or international humanitarian law (IHL).8 The lack of a 
comprehensive legal mechanism that governs the conduct between non-state armed 
groups and humanitarian agencies has impeded the UN’s ability to access certain 
regions, specifically those controlled by non-state armed groups, or NGCAs.  
Other explanations for the reasons behind UN agencies’ access challenges 
exist and indeed complement the main argument of the ineffectiveness of the legal 
framework governing non-state armed groups. These arguments include that the 
nature of modern conflicts and political dynamics in the international world has 
caused challenges for the UN that cannot be surpassed through their humanitarian 
                                                 
7 This is also true for cases such as Syria and Iraq; however, both cases have been 
omitted from the study because of the political complexities of both conflicts as well 
as the inability to use inconsistent data collected in NGCAs.   
8 The area of law that governs the conduct of parties to the conflict during warfare is 
known as international humanitarian law (IHL). 
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mandate.9 Other arguments go further than this by not only attributing these 
challenges to the fluctuation of political dynamics, but also emphasize that these 
political dynamics ensure that non-state armed groups remain within their current 
status as subsidiaries within the international legal system, rather than being 
considered main actors.10 Given that the UN operates within this political dynamic, it 
can be argued that the UN has been unable to alleviate these challenges. This UN 
ineffectiveness can be attributed to both executive and organizational drawbacks, 
where the executive drawbacks are a result of the policy restrictions caused by the 
political interests of states. Organizational constraints include their lack of 
organizational effectiveness, where it is believed that with its current structure and 
capabilities, the UN has been unable to fulfill its declared goals simply because it 
does not have the capacity to do so.11 The convergence of these constraints seems to 
be the most plausible illustration of reality, where the political dynamics of the 
international system in which the UN operates, leading them to become ineffective, 
can be considered reasons behind access challenges.12  
This does not derogate from the argument that the current legal system is 
lacking in effectiveness in governing non-state armed groups. On the contrary, it can 
be argued that the inefficiencies of the current legal framework governing non-state 
armed groups is one of the outcomes of the UN’s ineffectiveness within the political 
dynamics of the international system. More specifically, the continuous interests of 
states to maintain the current legal and political positioning of non-state armed groups 
contributes to the insufficiencies of the legal framework that currently governs non-
state armed groups. Within that framework of state interests, the UN is unable to 
integrate non-state armed groups within the legal system.  
 Because the current legal framework governing non-state armed groups is 
insufficient in fulfilling of the UN’s humanitarian mandate in conflict situations, it is 
important to assess the laws that govern the said groups, as they highly contribute to 
the UN’s ability to gain access to all areas with affected populations. Most notably, 
                                                 
9 McGoldrick, supra note 3, at 967 – 972.  
10 International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed 
Conflicts, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, (2011), at 48 – 52.  
11 See e.g. THORSTEN BENNER, STEPHAN MERGENTHALER & PHILIPP ROTMANN, THE 
NEW WORLD OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS: LEARNING TO BUILD PEACE? 12 – 50 (OUP 
Oxford, 2011).  
12 International Humanitarian Law, supra note 10, at 23 – 26.  
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the Geneva Conventions of 1949, their Additional Protocols, and customary 
international law have built a mechanism of governance of armed conflicts that is 
state-centric. This centricity has ultimately resulted in a framework that treats non-
state armed groups simply as an illegitimate entity within the legal system. However, 
it has become apparent that non-state armed groups’ increasing significance in 
international relations has created a legal importance for them, as they shape the 
dynamic of relations between other actors within the international system. Therefore, 
it is imperative that the legal framework governing non-state armed groups, 
specifically their relationship with humanitarian organizations, be revisited. 
Propositions will be made to further integrate these actors within the legal system so 
as to ensure that UN agencies are able to interact with them in a manner that holds 
both parties accountable as well as ensures that affected populations are receiving 
necessary aid. Simultaneously, policy reforms will be suggested to complement this 
legal reform to ensure the maximum effectiveness of the institutions that will 
implement them.   
 Within this paper, Part I introduces the narrative of access difficulties for UN 
agencies and attributes the cause to the legal framework governing non-state armed 
groups under IHL, whilst Part II provides an account of the humanitarian situation in 
the three mentioned states of Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine in order to contextualize the 
access challenges faced as a result of the current legal framework. Part III emphasizes 
the importance of recognizing non-state armed groups as a legitimate force in the 
international system, ensuring that although armed groups are not legally equivalent 
to a state, they remain significant actors in the international system. Part IV details 
and critiques the applicable laws within the context of non-state armed groups and 
access challenges, where the applicable laws are limited to international humanitarian 
law and customary international law. Part V briefly discusses the role of the United 
Nations at the executive and operational levels in causing access constraints for its 
agencies that can be attributed to the political dynamics within which the UN 
operates, which in turn affects the legal framework of international law and its 
application in governing non-state armed groups. In that light, Part VI finally argues 
for necessary changes in the law in order to accommodate the growing needs of 
populations in distress as a result of conflict through further integrating non-state 
armed groups within the international legal system. In addition, considering the role 
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of the UN in the international system, this part also acknowledges the need for 
operational and policy reform on the part of states and the UN.   
 7 
II. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION 
The current humanitarian situation of the aforementioned countries of Yemen, Libya, 
and Ukraine has been one of grave concern to the international community. The 
situations assessed are currently among the most violent conflicts witnessed since the 
eruption of their respective uprisings beginning as early as 2010. Following the 
uprisings in all three crises, UN agencies such as the World Food Program (WFP), 
United Nations Children’s Relief Fund (UNICEF), UN Women, United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), among other humanitarian organizations, resorted to their emergency 
mandates and began strategizing to enter these regions in order to provide aid to the 
distraught populations.  
Within this context, the role of other actors, aside from the legal framework 
governing non-state armed groups, is significant. The ineffectiveness of the UN at an 
executive and operational level has played a major role in prolonging the crises 
discussed.13 In addition, the involvement of third party states, specifically the West, 
whether directly or indirectly, in these crises have not only caused further 
complications in attempting to resolve the conflicts, but they have also played a major 
role in the actual creation of non-state armed groups in the regions as well as provided 
them with weaponry and financial support on several occasions, leading to the 
violence witnessed.14 Yet despite their involvement, they remain adamant on ensuring 
that non-state armed groups are maintained in their sidelined position under 
international law. Bearing this in mind, the three crises that will be discussed share 
resembling patterns in the genesis of non-state armed groups, whereby third parties 
are involved in the support, if not creation, of such groups but are unwilling to bear 
the legal or political responsibilities of such an outcome.15  
                                                 
13 See UN’s Pillay Slams Security Council ‘Failure’, AL JAZEERA, August 22, 2014; 
THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 
2014/15, (Feb. 2015). 
14 See e.g., Ryan Timothy Jacobs, A History of Conflict and International Intervention 
in Libya, 6 GLOBAL SECURITY STUDIES, 5 (2015).  
15 Garikai Chengu, America Created Al-Qaeda and the ISIS Terror Group, GLOBAL 
RESEARCH: CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION, (Feb. 2016), available at 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/america-created-al-qaeda-and-the-isis-terror-
group/5402881.  
 
 
 8 
In discussing the contexts of Yemen and Libya, it is important to understand that a 
large portion of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region was governed by 
absolutist regimes. This is important because the regional contexts feed directly into 
the two MENA cases of discussion. The eruption of uprisings throughout the region 
has led to an emergence of non-state armed groups performing cross-border 
operations that highly affect both Yemen and Libya. Since 2010, portions of Arab 
populations built dissenting responses against the despotic regimes whether for 
political, social, economic, or religious reasons. The Arab region as a whole 
witnessed a sequence of eruptions led by groups that formed during the reign of the 
respective dictators. To provide a brief background, the conflicts began with the 
Tunisian revolution in December 2010. Following this was the Egyptian Revolution 
in January 2011 alongside the Yemeni revolution, which paved the way for a Libyan 
revolution, which took place in February 2011 and is now known as the Libyan Civil 
War. Shortly after, protests erupted in Syria leading to the current civil conflict that 
began with religious segregation and oppression of the majority Sunni Muslims by the 
Alawite regime.16 Because the Tunisian and Egyptian cases are now relatively stable 
in terms of civil conflict, they will not be assessed as part of this study. Furthermore, 
because of the complexity of the Syrian case, due to the religious, cultural, and 
ultimately political nature of the conflict, it will also be omitted. Limiting the cases to 
Yemen and Libya serves this paper because of their prolonged civil conflicts that 
involve non-state armed groups as primary actors within the conflicts.  
On the Eastern European front, the Ukrainian crisis also faces similar conditions 
as that of the Yemeni and Libyan conflicts. The Ukrainian strife erupted in November 
2013 where a civil conflict occurred highly based on political and ethnic beliefs, 
effectively segregating Ukraine into a Western front, which is government controlled, 
and an Eastern front, nongovernment controlled.17 The Ukrainian conflict is added to 
                                                 
16The facts presented regarding the Middle Eastern conflicts can be found at UNITED 
NATIONS PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS, (2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2011.pdf (last visited Nov 4, 
2015). 
17The facts presented regarding the Ukrainian conflict can be found at Humanitarian 
Response, OFFICE FOR COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION [hereinafter 
‘OCHA’], available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine 
(last visited Nov 5, 2015). 
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the case studies to ensure that the arguments presented regarding UN agencies’ access 
challenges in emergency situations are not ethnocentric or specific to the MENA 
region, but rather are a global concern. Furthermore, the actions of non-state armed 
groups in Eastern Ukraine somewhat differ in nature than that of the Yemeni and 
Libyan situations in such that they are more limited to their region and rarely perform 
cross-border operations. This example serves as an asset to the study, as it illustrates 
the difficulties in the UN’s interaction with non-state armed groups regardless of the 
location of their operations.  
In order to understand the access challenges that UN agencies face when dealing 
with non-state armed groups, it is important to provide an account of the humanitarian 
situation of each of the three conflicts as well as outline the activities that UN 
agencies undertake as a method of fulfilling their humanitarian mandate and 
providing aid to affected populations.  
A. Yemen 
In 2011, Yemeni opposition groups were forming to combat the tyranny of its 
despotic government.  Some of these groups became militia groups who were equally 
responsible for the bloodshed witnessed throughout the years. By November 2011, 
former President Ali Abdullah Saleh transferred his power to Vice President 
Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi who later became President through elections that took place 
in February 2012. However, this was faced with great dissent from a large ethnic 
group that descends from a Muslim sect of Shias called the Houthis, who were largely 
in support of the former President. This group became recognized as a non-state 
armed group, or a rebel group, which currently opposes the Yemeni government and 
performs large-scale armed attacks against government forces. The Hadi government 
has also gained considerable support by what are known as the anti-Houthi forces. In 
the process, Yemen’s security forces have also been segregated with each party 
pledging their loyalties to the opposing sides. Both the Houthis and anti-Houthi forces 
are further faced with hostilities from the non-state armed group of al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that are mostly situated in the south and south-east of 
Yemen.  
In 2014, Houthi forces officially took control of the government and 
overthrew the Hadi government. In response, anti-Houthi forces have been 
combatting the current Houthi government, and in their assistance, a Saudi-led 
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coalition is politically and militarily aiding them with airstrikes. Other factions 
consider both the Houthis and their opposition militia groups. The Islamic State (IS), 
who is labeled as a terrorist organization, also joined the conflict by opposing both the 
anti-Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. Each of these actors is situated in a 
particular region in Yemen, where Houthi forces, who support the former President 
Saleh and are aided by the Islamic State, are mostly situated in the east. The anti-
Houthi forces, supporting the allegedly legitimate President Hadi and are aided by the 
Saudi coalition, are situated in the south. Constant clashes between these groups in 
various areas around Yemen lead to assumption that control is quite arbitrary between 
each faction.  
Nevertheless, a consistent pattern of control is observed, whereby the control 
of provinces is split between these coalitions. The Houthi forces are fighting the Saudi 
coalition in the Taiz in the southwest and Marib in the western region where each 
party is attempting to take control of towns and villages in those areas. The anti-
Houthi forces and Saudi coalition are focused in Aden, where Hadi rallied supporters 
from the segregated national military in order to seize control of the province against 
the Houthi forces. By late 2015, the Saudi-led coalition was in fact able to take 
control over Aden and is currently based there. Meanwhile, the Houthi forces have 
taken control over a large portion of western Yemen including the capital city Sana’a 
and other major cities and ports such as Al-Hudaydah, Sa’dah, Amran, and Dhamar.18 
Other areas in the west are considered to have disputed control and consistent armed 
conflict such as Taiz, Ibb, Al-Bayda, and Marib. Mukalla in the south and Hadramawt 
in the east are largely controlled by AQAP fighting against both the Houthis and the 
Saudi coalition, whilst IS carries out arbitrary attacks throughout Yemen, specifically 
in the capital.19 
With this in mind, it is clear that large portions of the western and southern 
regions of Yemen are facing severe conflict with violence extending from military 
facilities to civilian areas. According to the United Nations Office for the 
                                                 
18 Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, Oct. 2015, at 2.  
19 Id.; Chronology of Events: Yemen, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (2016), available 
at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/yemen.php?page=1 (last visited 
Apr 24, 2016); Yemen Crisis: Who Is Fighting Whom? BBC (2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423 (last visited Apr 24, 2016). 
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Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), only one year after the armed 
conflict in Yemen broke out, approximately 21.2 million people were in need of some 
form of humanitarian assistance. This comprises approximately 82 percent of the 
Yemeni population, which is already the least developed nation in the MENA region. 
In terms of food insecurity, 14.4 million people are food insecure, with 7.6 of these 
who are severely food insecure. In addition, 19.4 million people lack clean water and 
sanitation and 14.1 million are unable to be provided with adequate healthcare. An 
approximate 600 of the Yemeni health facilities have been forced to close down due 
to damage of infrastructure with a high shortage of critical health supplies. Of these 
facilities, about 220 facilities that provide treatment for acute malnutrition were 
forced to close. At least 2.7 million of the affected population is internally displaced, 
where internally displaced persons (IDPs) have left their homes and migrated to other 
provinces in Yemen or to neighboring countries such as Djibouti or Saudi Arabia. 
Finally, civilians are at risk of both physical and psychosocial well-being. Over 50 per 
cent of the population is in need of protection including 7.4 million children. There 
has been an average of 41 reports of human rights violations being verified every day 
since January 2016. Since mid-March 2015, more than 1.8 million children dropped 
out of school as a result of the conflict causing the total school dropout rate to reach 
more than 3.4 million students. By January 2016, 1,170 schools have become 
inadequate for use due to IDPs occupying schools for shelter or armed groups 
controlling the facility.20  
Considering these staggering figures, and the fact that western and southern 
regions of Yemen consist of the highest population density, what with the inclusion of 
the capital city of Sana’a and large cities such as Al Hudaydah and Taiz, a large 
portion of the affected population that is most in need of humanitarian aid is currently 
under the control of non-state armed groups. Humanitarian organizations attempting 
to aid these populations have faced a significant challenge of access constraints. This 
is due to several reasons, which include the security hazards that may risk the lives of 
UN personnel. Another issue is the damaged infrastructure such as roads, warehouses, 
and highways that is caused by the conflict. Thirdly, there is the challenge of being 
granted access by the controlling authority in a particular region. Although the UN 
                                                 
20 Yemen Crisis Overview, OCHA, (2015), available at 
http://www.unocha.org/yemen/crisis-overview (last visited Apr 24, 2016). 
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should be granted access by the Yemeni government, there remains difficulties in 
accessing regions that are controlled by non-state armed groups, who in several cases 
restrict the access of humanitarian convoys for their own security or political reasons. 
Attempting to gain access without authorization from the designated authority poses a 
security hazard on the convoys attempting to reach affected populations. This brings 
us to the final challenge, which is the controversy in the recognition of a particular 
government as the legitimate authority of the state that should be granting access 
authorization to UN agencies. These challenges can largely be attributed to non-state 
armed groups’ lack of adherence to international law principles, specifically those of 
IHL.  
Complementing these practical and legal challenges, the situation in Yemen 
exhibits simultaneous political challenges that exacerbate the conflict and demonstrate 
the ineffectiveness of the UN at the executive level and the insufficiencies within the 
legal framework governing non-state armed groups. It is apparent that the 
involvement of the Saudi-led coalition has not deterred the threat of the rebel groups 
in Yemen. On the contrary, what is witnessed is that the involvement of a third party 
state made the conflict worse on the political front as well as on the ground. This 
involvement has led to the more violent emergence of non-state armed groups that 
have the aim of combatting foreign intervention.21 Furthermore, the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) has been highly selective in condemning violations of international 
law, whether they are IHL violations or general principles of non-intervention.22 
Under international law, the principle of non-intervention should be adhered to in all 
conflict situations, except if this intervention is on behalf of the state and will 
potentially mitigate the intensity of the conflict or result in finding a political 
solution.23 However, it is evident that this was not nearly the case in Yemen.  
                                                 
21 Zachary Laub, Yemen in Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2016), 
http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488 (last visited Apr 19, 2016). 
22 Non-intervention is a principle that Article 3 of the Additional Protocol II of the 
Geneva Conventions provides, whereby third party states may not intervene in a 
conflict of non-international character. In practice, this provision is loosely applied if 
the third party state is intervening on behalf of the government of the state where the 
conflict is taking place.  
23 Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 
(2015), with Russian Federation Abstaining, UNITED NATIONS, April 14, 2015, 
available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm (last visited Apr 19, 
2016). 
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The intervention of the Saudi-led coalition, in addition to the overwhelming 
support given to Saudi Arabia by the US and UK in financing weaponry, both of 
which were approved by the UN, has led to the death and injury of far more civilians 
than anticipated.24 This is where it is evident that the UN has been highly ineffective 
in ensuring that a peaceful resolution of the conflict is reached. It is also evident that 
the decisions of the UN were based highly on the political dynamics of the system, 
which is seen where states and the UN immediately resort to combatting non-state 
armed groups militarily. It seems that the rationale behind this kind of decision is that, 
under the current framework that governs non-state actors, a political solution may 
not be reached with such groups. This means that states are either attempting to use 
international law to combat non-state armed groups but are failing, or that 
international law itself has failed to provide a legitimate avenue for dealing with such 
groups. Either way, the laws, as they are today, are an inefficient mechanism of 
governing the interactions between non-state armed groups and other entities. Such a 
situation is replicated in the Libyan crisis, where the conflict has involved both a high 
level of violence posed by non-state armed groups and ineffectiveness of the UN as a 
result of the political dynamics of the international system.  
B. Libya 
The Libyan conflict began in February 2011 with uprisings spreading throughout 
Benghazi and other cities in protest of the despotic regime ruled formerly by President 
Muammar Gaddafi. Anti-Gaddafi rebels and security forces engaged in violent 
clashes that lasted for several weeks. Just as the Yemen crisis involved a third party 
state, NATO was in involved in the Libya crisis. The UN Security Council (UNSC) 
was highly involved in attempting to ensure the protection of civilians throughout 
Libya. In March 2011, the UNSC condemned the ongoing air strikes and authorized a 
no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians. NATO was responsible for ensuring that 
this was enforced, hence their involvement in the conflict. Nevertheless, anti-Gaddafi 
rebels had begun seizing territories within Libya, but were constantly defeated by pro-
Gaddafi forces that were better armed.  
                                                 
24 Ewen MacAskill, UN Report into Saudi-led Strikes in Yemen Raises Questions 
Over UK Role, THE GUARDIAN, January 27, 2016, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/27/un-report-into-saudi-led-strikes-in-
yemen-raises-questions-over-uk-role (last visited Mar 27, 2016). 
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In July 2011, the opposition forces gained enough manpower and weaponry to 
take over large segments of Libya. They became known as the National Transitional 
Council (NTC) and were then recognized as the legitimate government of Libya by 
the International Contact Group on Libya and 60 other countries as well as the 
African Union. At the beginning of 2012, however, the NTC had not fulfilled the 
promises it made when it assumed power and clashes erupted between former rebel 
groups as a result causing the deputy head, Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, to resign. Further 
tensions arose when the NTC was split between officials in Benghazi and those in the 
center, Tripoli. Those in Benghazi were attempting to reestablish autonomy for the 
region, causing a power struggle between authorities. Throughout the first half of 
2012, violent clashes occurred between government forces and local militias. 
Elections were then held to appease the population, and the General National 
Congress (GNC) became the legitimate authority within Libya. Throughout this, local 
militia groups and opposition forces were emerging and increasing in numbers and 
support to combat other factions and the government.  
By 2014, Libya had been witnessing countless factions emerging in the region, 
where different factions seized control of pockets of land throughout Libya, just as in 
the Yemen crisis.  Several militia groups that had emerged to combat the Gaddafi 
regime remained in dissent, specifically towards the GNC, which refused to leave its 
post after its mandate had expired. The Libyan National Army emerges in the process 
to combat the Islamist groups that appeared in Libya at the beginning of 2014 to seize 
the opportunity of the power vacuum. A civil war erupts in Libya that causes raids on 
government buildings and facilities as well as civilian homes. This was made worse 
when a new parliament was elected and pro-GNC factions begin clashing with the 
supporters of the new parliament. The deterioration of the security situation led UN 
staff to be forced to evacuate from Libya and shut down their operations. Foreigners 
also evacuated Libya as embassies were forced to shut down. The international airport 
of Tripoli was also significantly damaged by the conflict, making it even more 
difficult for people to leave Libya. An Islamist group called Ansar al-Sharia then rose 
amidst the conflict to seize control of large portions of Benghazi, whilst the Islamist 
Libya Dawn militias controlled most of Tripoli. Other Islamist groups controlled ports 
such as the port of Derna in eastern Libya making it increasingly difficult for UN 
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convoys and shipments to be delivered into Libya.25 Libya was effectively split 
between the east and the west causing an immense amount of displacement of people.  
By 2015, the Islamic State established control over the port-city of Sirte, 
which is located along the coast of Libya between Tripoli and Benghazi. UN 
organizations that relied on shipments from Turkey were therefore blocked from 
sending aid to areas of northern Libya. The Libyan Army attempted to recapture 
seized regions but failed on multiple occasions. The new parliament and government 
had been forced, since 2014, to base their operations from Tobruk, as several militia 
groups captured and continue to clash in the largest two cities of Benghazi and 
Tripoli. Militia groups and Islamist militants also began to secure areas rich with 
resources throughout Libya. The IS attacked Ras Lanuf oil terminal and attempts to 
ensure that the Libyan government is unable to secure its own resources. The main 
cities and ports that are highly affected by the conflict and remain insecure are 
Benghazi, Tripoli, Misrata, Sirte, Sabha, and Darnah, which are spread out between 
the west and the east.  
The humanitarian situation in Libya is not all that different from that of 
Yemen. The armed conflict has affected more than 3 million people throughout 
Libya. Approximately 2.4 million, around 80 percent of the affected population, are in 
need of protection and humanitarian assistance. These largely include IDPs, refugees, 
asylum-seekers, migrants, and those non-displaced but remain affected by the 
conflict. In terms of health care, there is a major shortage in medical supplies and 
health care systems. With the remaining supplies, there is still minimal access to such 
services. Infrastructure is highly damaged, causing difficulties in transportation for 
those trapped amidst the conflict. IDPs are the most affected and vulnerable as a result 
of the conflict due to their lack of coping capacity and their loss of assets such as 
homes, transportation methods, and basic supplies. Those who are severely affected 
are populations situated in the east and south of the country.26 
                                                 
25 Libya Profile - Timeline, BBC (2016), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13755445 (last visited Mar 27, 2016); David 
Poort & Ismaeel Naar, Timeline: Three Years After Libya’s Uprising, AL JAZEERA, 
May 19, 2014, available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2014/02/timeline-three-years-after-
libya-uprising-201421691755192622.html.  
26 Libya, OCHA, available at http://www.unocha.org/romena/about-us/about-ocha-
regional/libya (last visited Mar 20, 2016). 
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Although the Libyan situation is similar to that of Yemen, it is more severe in 
terms of access constraints. It is increasingly difficult to estimate the exact number of 
those affected in Libya because until today, UN presence in Libya is highly limited. 
There are only a handful of missions that go into Libya to assess the security situation 
without being able to administer concrete needs assessments. UN agencies currently 
operate mostly from Tunisia and through their cooperating partners within the borders 
of Libya. Yet, these partners are limited in their capacity of distribution of aid and are 
also unable to access certain regions due to safety concerns and the presence of non-
state armed groups. The largest issue facing humanitarian agencies is these groups’ 
unpredictability and lack of adherence to international law principles. Their attacks 
are arbitrary and take little, if any, consideration of civilian life.  Much like Yemen, 
large portions of the affected population in need of humanitarian assistance is under 
the control of non-state armed groups such as in Tripoli and Benghazi. Access 
constraints make the situation all the more difficult as well as the issue of damaged 
infrastructure and authorization to enter insecure areas, both from the UN and from 
non-state state armed groups. Of the most difficult challenges is the controversy in 
recognition of the legitimate authority, as is the case of Yemen. In some cases, militia 
groups may simply reject authorization to access an area because the UN recognizes 
an authority that the militia group opposes. The result is that affected populations are 
unable to receive the required assistance. In many instances, there are cases of 
civilians dying of starvation, illness, and disease because assistance was not received. 
This is where the importance of adhering to the principles of international law 
presents itself.  
Much like the Yemeni situation, international law has been unable to mitigate 
the impact of the conflict. Again, this is highly attributed to the political dynamics 
between states as well as the inability of the UN to separate itself from those 
dynamics. This has ultimately affected the way in which international law as applied 
to the Libyan conflict just as in the Yemeni conflict. There are two main elements in 
this context: the first is the significance of government recognition and the second is 
the controversy of foreign intervention, both of which affect the application of 
international law.  Regarding the former, there are a number of factors that affect the 
conflict whether operationally or legally depending on which government in Libya is 
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recognized as the legitimate government. The significance of government recognition 
under international law lies ultimately within the applicability of laws on the different 
groups. It also affects the latter, where foreign intervention can be permitted on behalf 
of the government in the case of a non-international armed conflict.  
With regards to government recognition, the situation is quite tricky and 
controversial. Although the Tobruk-based House of Representatives27 elected in 2014 
is the internationally recognized as the government of Libya with considerable 
support from the European Union (EU), Egypt, and the UAE,28 the GNC based in 
Tripoli is also considered the legitimate government for other entities such as Qatar, 
Sudan, Turkey, and Islamist coalitions such as the Muslim Brotherhood.29 
Nevertheless, the political recognition of the House of Representatives has given this 
legitimate government the rights and obligations of a state under international law. 
Whereas the government based in Tripoli has not been afforded the same rights or 
obligations. In fact, this government has been treated similar to, or considered legally 
and politically equal to the Islamist militia groups located within Libya. Furthermore, 
a ruling from the Libyan Supreme Court in Tripoli deemed the House of 
Representatives unconstitutional and illegal, yet was still recognized internationally 
despite any legitimacy that the Supreme Court may hold.30   This is because the GNC, 
on many occasions, has expressed its support to Islamist groups such as Ansar al-
Sharia and ISIS.31 In this case, the political recognition of the Tobruk government has 
                                                 
27 This is also known as the Council of Deputies.  
28 Rebecca Murray, Libya: A Tale of Two Governments, AL JAZEERA, April 4, 2015, 
available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/libya-tale-governments-
150404075631141.html.  
29 Stephen, Chris, War in Libya - The Guardian Briefing, THE GUARDIAN, August 29, 
2014, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/-sp-briefing-war-
in-libya; Bashir says Sudan to work with UAE to control fighting in Libya, AHRAM 
ONLINE, February 23, 2015, available at 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/0/123755/World/0/Bashir-says-Sudan-to-
work-with-UAE-to-control-figh.aspx, (last visited Mar 22, 2016).  
30 Murray, supra note 28.   
31 Hadi Fornaji, Omar Al-Hassi in “beautiful” Ansar row while “100” GNC members 
meet, LIBYA HERALD, November 18, 2014, available at 
https://www.libyaherald.com/2014/11/18/omar-al-hassi-in-beautiful-ansar-row-while-
100-gnc-members-meet/; Jason Pack & Mattia Toaldo, Why Picking Sides in Libya 
Won’t Work, FOREIGN POLICY, March 6, 2015, available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/06/libya-civil-war-tobruk-un-negotiations-
morocco/. (Noting, “One is the internationally recognized government based in the 
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superseded the recognition of the Tripoli government, although the GNC was elected 
far before the eastern government was founded. It can be argued that this recognition 
is a result of the GNC’s political affiliations with internationally recognized militia 
groups, not because of any substantial sovereignty given to the House of 
Representatives. Therefore, this political reality has ultimately led to the imposition of 
theoretically differentiated laws between the two governments. The legality of such a 
situation will be further elaborated on in Chapter IV.32 Although the UN has made 
efforts to reconcile the two factions through putting forth unity treaties and attempting 
to create a unified government, it is quite clear that the UN’s affiliations are directed 
more to one entity rather than the other. This ultimately negates the alleged neutral 
ideologies of the UN simply because certain states refuse to recognize entities that are 
affiliated with so-called militia groups. Such is also proven with the second element 
discussed here; the approval of foreign intervention on behalf of an internationally 
recognized faction over the other.  
Foreign intervention has directly resulted in the worsening of the Libyan 
conflict, according to a UN representative.33 There are a number of factors at play, all 
of which are caused by political dynamics. Some would argue that the NATO and US 
intervention in Libya can be considered a war, in which case the American 
administration has been blamed for their reserved attitude towards the whole 
intervention. Furthermore, the administration has also been blamed for the financial 
burden that this intervention has created on the US economy. The debates surrounding 
the rightfulness of the US’s intervention primarily focus on the lack of economic 
benefit that the US gained from such a move. Many speculate that considering the 
British and US oil companies had begun to control Libyan oil under the Gaddafi 
                                                                                                                                            
eastern city of Tobruk and its military wing, Operation Dignity, led by General 
Khalifa Haftar. The other is the Tripoli government installed by the Libya Dawn 
coalition, which combines Islamist militias with armed groups from the city of 
Misrata. The Islamic State has recently established itself as a third force”).  
32 This refers to the differences in legal obligations imposed and rights granted based 
on the nature of the entity, i.e. states, non-state armed groups, international 
organizations, etc. under the provisions of international humanitarian law in armed 
conflicts.  
33 Jason Kaplan, Libya War Update: Foreign Military Intervention Will Worsen 
Humanitarian Crisis, UN Envoy Warns, IBTIMES, February 28, 2016, available at 
http://www.ibtimes.com/libya-war-update-foreign-military-intervention-will-worsen-
humanitarian-crisis-un-2328775. 
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regime that their intervention was primarily inclined towards protecting their 
investment.34 What this means is that this intervention, under international law, was 
not motivated by the need to mitigate the impact of the conflict, but rather was driven 
primarily by politically and economically strategic interests of the NATO alliance. 
Even if it was to be assumed that the purpose of the intervention was aligned with the 
principles of international law, the effect of the intervention was detrimental to the 
Libyan population in several ways, some of which include that they have worsened 
the overall humanitarian situation in Libya and have increased the presence as well as 
level of violence posed by non-state armed groups in the country.35  
In addition, ideally NATO’s intervention should have been made to restore 
peace in Libya, hence the UNSC’s authorization of the intervention with Resolution 
1973. Considering that NATO is a regional organization, it technically does not fall 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, and the intervention is therefore considered “legally 
dubious”36 yet was still authorized by the UNSC. NATO’s involvement was not an 
act of self-defense and the organization should have been forbidden from taking 
collective offense action in Libya. Therefore, it is clear that the political dynamics of 
the international system not only resulted in an unnecessary and purely political 
foreign intervention effectively questioning the UN’s effectiveness in restoring peace 
in Libya, but also caused an influx of violence as a result of the intervention through 
the further emergence of non-state armed groups in the region causing further distress. 
This is slightly different from the situation witnessed in Ukraine, as the controversy of 
government recognition and foreign intervention are not the main issues.  
C. Ukraine 
The Ukrainian crisis consists of two main dimensions; the ethnic front and the 
political front. The conflict erupted in November 2013 where the Ukrainian 
government abandoned their original intent to improve their economic ties with the 
EU and resorted to seeking closer ties with Russia. The Ukrainian capital Kiev 
witnessed a high number of demonstrations. Russia then provided financial aid to 
                                                 
34 Jacobs, supra note 14, at 5.  
35 Christopher S. Chivvis & Jeffrey Martini, Libya After Qaddafi, RAND 
CORPORATION - NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION, 2014, at 13 – 16.    
36 Ademola Abass, Assessing NATO’s involvement in Libya, UNITED NATIONS 
UNIVERSITY, October 27, 2011, available at 
http://unu.edu/publications/articles/assessing-nato-s-involvement-in-libya.html.  
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Ukraine to relieve Ukraine of its economic debt and simultaneously decreased the 
prices of Russian gas supply to Ukraine. In response to the protests, the parliament 
passed anti-protest laws that were ineffective in dealing with the opposition. Instead, 
protesters raided governmental offices and buildings. Any governmental attempts to 
appease the Ukrainian population were met with further opposition. Ukrainian 
President Yanukovych began to negotiate with opposition forces and signed a 
compromise with them in 2014, yet the clashes remained violent. The parliament then 
voted to remove the president from power and moved to rally for new elections. Anti-
Russian sentiments were extended throughout the country both politically and 
socially, whilst pro-Russian supporters began to rally as well, mostly in the Eastern 
Ukrainian region.  
 To make matters worse, the Russian parliament approved Russia’s use of 
force in Ukraine as a form of protecting Russian interests in Ukraine. Shortly after, 
Crimea was annexed to Russia through a referendum and was effectively split from 
Ukraine. In the process, protests erupted in Eastern Ukraine demanding independence 
of the oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, also known as the Donbas region. Acting 
President Turchynov began an anti-terrorist campaign against the pro-Russian 
separatists in the Eastern Ukrainian region. The conflict then became largely situated 
in Eastern Ukraine where ethnic militia groups took control of the Donbas region. 
These militia groups considered themselves of separate from the Ukrainian ethnicity. 
Although these are not necessarily intending to join Russia as Crimea did, their 
sentiments remained pro-Russian. Militia groups in both regions then declared 
independence through a public referendum in attempts to create a separate entity. 
Ukraine proceeded to hold presidential elections where Petro Poroshekno was elected 
while the east was not involved much in this process. Ties with the EU and Ukraine 
were then reinstated and the separatists in Eastern Ukraine continued to act in 
violence against Ukrainian forces. Meanwhile, Russia retracted its forces in Ukraine 
and the EU and US imposed new sanctions on Russia. Russia remained in support of 
the eastern Ukrainian sentiment to secede from Ukraine and considering the lack of 
access to aid in eastern Ukraine, the Russian government delivered a large convoy to 
Luhansk without authorization from the Ukrainian government.  
This political dynamic has been a cause of challenges faced by UN agencies, 
including Russia’s empowerment of the separatist groups making it far more difficult 
to treat these groups as rebels as opposed to legitimate forces in the international 
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system, who have become both militarily and economically powerful. Russia’s 
political and financial support to these groups have created a power struggle between 
the government and these entities, which has in turn hindered the ability to restore 
peace in Ukraine.   
There were several attempts at ceasefire throughout 2014, which were 
allegedly finalized when the Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian separatists 
signed a truce. To that end, Russian troops withdrew themselves from eastern 
Ukraine. Human Rights Watch has shown evidence that the Ukrainian government 
violated the truce by attacking areas in Donetsk that are largely populated with 
civilians. Finally, separatists in eastern Ukraine elected new leaders with the support 
of Russia effectively creating the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk 
People’s Republic (LPR). In the peace process attempt, eastern Ukraine has been 
deadlocked in a situation of limited resources and access to aid. Russian aid has been 
highly compromised due to the sanctions and lack of access to the territory has left 
thousands of people insecure well into 2016.37 
 This made the humanitarian situation quite severe in the whole of Ukraine. 
Although the conflict itself is mainly focused in the Eastern region, the attacks on 
other parts of Ukraine have caused large displacement and a lack of access to basic 
services. This is specifically true in regions that are surrounding the contact line 
between GCAs and NGCAs. As of February 2016, there are approximately 3.7 
million people affected by the conflict and an additional 1.75 million who are IDPs.38 
There are approximately 300,000 people at risk of death due to the lack of access to 
clean water.39 Considering Ukraine is more developed than Libya and Yemen, the 
humanitarian situation is somewhat less detrimental to the livelihoods of those living 
at a far distances from the physical clashes. However, there is a spillover effect in 
                                                 
37 Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC WORLD, November 13, 2014, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275 (last visited Mar 29, 2016); 
Minsk Contact Group Reaches Agreement on Easter Ceasefire, THE UKRAINE CRISIS 
TIMELINE, available at http://csis.org/ukraine/index.htm (last visited Mar 28, 2016). 
38 UKRAINE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION REPORT #43, UNITED NATIONS 
INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN’S RELIEF FUND [hereinafter UNICEF], 1 (1 – 29 February 
2016), available at http://www.unicef.org/ukraine/UNICEF_Ukraine_Sitrep_43_1-
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39 HUMANITARIAN BULLETIN: UKRAINE, ISSUE 08, OCHA, 1 (1 – 31 March 2016), 
available at 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/bulletin_march_16_v1_eng.pdf. 
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several parts of Ukraine due to the massive numbers of displaced persons and the lack 
of access to areas with resources that affects the livelihoods of individuals who would 
otherwise be secure. Furthermore, the constant closure of checkpoints between GCAs 
and NGCAs, specifically the Zolote checkpoint, which is an essential yet volatile 
crossing between the two areas, has led to a mass displacement of people attempting 
to flee the conflict. Other motives for crossing the checkpoint include the attempt to 
seek refuge in the GCAs, considering that on several occasions the government of 
Ukraine has suspended social payments to IDPs and created an elongated process of 
verification for IDP status. Records show that over 720,000 people in March 2016 
have crossed through the five main checkpoints across the contact line between the 
GCAs and NGCAs. This is a 76 percent increase than the number of people crossing 
in February 2016, which amounted to 410,000 crossings.40 It is therefore evident that 
the humanitarian situation throughout Ukraine, whether it is in the GCAs or the 
NGCAs, is highly concerning.  
 Considering the difficulties on the ground, UN agencies have faced a 
significant access constraint in both the GCAs and the NGCAs. Overall, this is a 
result of the conflict between the separatist non-state armed groups, also referred to as 
the de facto authorities of LPR and DPR, and the Ukrainian forces. In specific to the 
NGCAs, UN agencies are facing a stringent accreditation process imposed by the de 
facto authorities, which makes it severely challenging for humanitarian aid to be 
distributed to the affected populations. Also noting that the situation within the GCAs 
has deteriorating and as a result, there is an influx of IDPs entering the NGCAs, it 
makes it even more difficult for UN agencies to attend to the growing needs of such 
populations. Furthermore, there is a consistent closing and reopening of checkpoints 
that is a reflection of the political tension between the Ukrainian government and the 
de facto authorities. Most recently, the de facto authorities have closed checkpoints to 
limit the number of GCA civilians entering their areas. This is because they claim that 
the opening of the checkpoint was not coordinated with them by the government.41  
The de facto authorities are also limiting the number of cooperating partners, 
mostly local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or international NGOs, that are 
granted accreditation in the NGCA. This is largely due to the authorities’ need to 
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41 Id. at 3.   
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control the goods entering their territory to ensure maximum supervision. It is also 
due to the fact that the authorities have requested on multiple occasions for the UN’s 
recognition of their independence. Considering UN agencies’ mandates, they are 
bound by the UN’s executive recognition of the state, which is usually derived from 
Security Council or General Assembly resolutions, and which does not exist in this 
case. UN agencies are also bound by their ties and agreements with the Ukrainian 
government, which will potentially be severed if a UN agency recognizes the de facto 
authorities. This would also harm the UN’s reputation and could also face a restriction 
in UN presence in the GCAs of Ukraine, which would defeat the purpose of providing 
aid to their populations.  
In conclusion, all three crises in Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine face highly 
concerning humanitarian situations with their populations having little access to 
health care, supplies, food, clean water, among other necessities. They are each 
experiencing a high level of IDPs, migrants, and refugees, although the issue of 
refugees and migrants is not as pressing in Ukraine; however, the Ukrainian IDP 
crisis has resulted in the escalation of the severity of the crisis. UN agencies face 
access issues to certain regions within these countries due to the existence of non-state 
armed groups that do not adhere to the principles of IHL, which has been made worse 
as a result of the political dynamics surrounding the three conflicts. This reality has 
caused the access restraints for UN agencies because of safety hazards as well as non-
state armed groups’ reluctance to ensure access for humanitarian organizations to aid 
the respective states’ affected populations. This is highly attributed to the gaps in the 
laws that govern non-state armed groups as well as the political interests of states that 
expand the gap even further.   
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III. NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
In the three crises of Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine, it is evident that non-state armed 
groups are of the main actors in each of the conflicts. Their presence and activities 
play key roles in the countries’ political and strategic dynamics. They are also 
decisive in curtailing UN access to regions controlled by these groups. It is important 
to determine how significant these actors really are in the international system, 
whether politically or legally and to assess the extent of the impact that non-state 
actors have on the international system. In other words, it is necessary to determine if 
the presence of non-state armed groups in armed conflicts and the challenges they 
pose to UN agencies are in fact worth the trouble of reforming the international legal 
system.  
Scholars differ on non-state armed groups’ significance and the perspectives 
on their role in international law are diverse. Looking at the significance of non-state 
actors in general, there is a general view that the role of the state is diminishing with 
the emergence of international organizations, NGOs, and non-state armed groups.42 
This is because they have increased in numbers and political influence throughout the 
past decades leading them to become an important part of the decision-making 
processes of states.43 The inclusion of international organizations and NGOs has 
become more necessary and significant. Although there has been a relative statistical 
reduction in worldwide extreme poverty in the past half-decade and access to 
healthcare has improved,44 there is a still need for such organizations to ensure the 
sustainability of those who are subject to falling back into poverty or being faced with 
                                                 
42 See Non-State Actors in the International System of States in ASHGATE RESEARCH 
COMPANION 1, (Bob Reinalda ed., Ashgate Publishing) (2011).  
43 See THOMAS G. WEISS, D. CONOR SEYLE, AND KELSEY COOLIDGE, THE RISE OF 
NON-STATE ACTORS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (One Earth Future Foundation) (2013).   
44 World Bank Forecasts Global Poverty to Fall Below 10% for First Time; Major 
Hurdles Remain in Goal to End Poverty by 2030, THE WORLD BANK (2016), 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/04/world-
bank-forecasts-global-poverty-to-fall-below-10-for-first-time-major-hurdles-remain-
in-goal-to-end-poverty-by-2030 (last visited May 7, 2016); for a detailed report on the 
2015 poverty statistics, refer to Marcio Cruz et al., Ending Extreme Poverty and 
Sharing Prosperity: Progress and Policies, WORLD BANK GROUP, 2015; Max Roser, 
World Poverty, OUR WORLD IN DATA, (2016), available at 
https://ourworldindata.org/world-poverty/. 
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health care deprivation.45 Furthermore, with the global increases in war and conflict, 
the implications of the refugee, migrant, and displacement crises have also led to a 
growing need for these organizations to assist the international community in 
alleviating these challenges.46 Their significance is therefore rising in order to aid 
populations in need specifically if their respective governments are not willing or able 
to do so. More specifically, the significance of non-state armed groups must be 
addressed, as they have a direct role in shaping the politics of the international system 
and pose unprecedented challenges for development.47 Further to this, the 
deterioration of the state’s role in international relations has caused a cyclic effect, 
resulting in an increase in the number of non-state armed groups further challenging 
the existence of the state.  
However, considering that non-state armed groups are yet to be involved in 
the decision-making processes of state relations specifically in conflict situations, this 
view is somewhat flawed. Conversely, NGOs and international organizations have 
been much more involved in decision-making processes than non-state armed 
groups.48 This is evident in situations of conflict where states will form peace 
agreements with other states and cooperation agreements with international 
organizations to ensure that these organizations are able to access the populations in 
need. In this instance, states are relying on humanitarian organizations, to some 
extent, to ensure the livelihoods of their people are preserved specifically in conflict 
situations, and are therefore involved in the decision-making process. The same is not 
true for such processes with regards to non-state armed groups. Although it is valid to 
argue that non-state armed groups have increased in significance in the international 
scene, this does not necessarily decrease the centricity of states within the system of 
                                                 
45 PAT GIBBONS & HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE, THE HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGE: 20 
YEARS EUROPEAN NETWORK ON HUMANITARIAN ACTION, 43 – 44 (Springer, 2015).  
46 See Weiss, Seyle, and Coolidge, supra note 43. 
47 This is not to say that NGOs and international organizations, including international 
financial institutions (IFIs), have not played a critical role in the creation of poverty 
and lack of development in several countries. However, some have also played a role 
in alleviating the challenges that affected populations face through humanitarian aid 
and policymaking. See Robert Pinkney, International NGOs: Missionaries or 
Imperialists? in NGOS, AFRICA, AND THE GLOBAL ORDER, (Springer, 2009); Edward 
A. Fogarty, States, Nonstate Actors, and Global Governance: Projecting Polities, 19 
ROUTLEDGE ADVANCES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, (Routledge, 2013).   
48 Weiss, Seyle, and Coolidge, supra note 43, at 9 – 11.  
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international relations in conflict situations. The mere existence of non-state armed 
groups follows the same pattern of increasing numbers as that of NGOs and 
international organizations; however, the difference is that these non-state armed 
groups are armed and may represent a particular dissenting belief towards a state. 
This is why states are resistant to including non-state armed groups in the decision-
making processes; because they threaten the legitimacy of the regime.49 Thus, there is 
a requirement of state consent under international law to incorporate non-state armed 
groups into the political process, which effectively still qualifies the state as the main 
actor under international law.50  
Noting a different view, some scholars argue that non-state armed groups are 
simply a byproduct of the international system and their existence is of little 
consequence amidst a system governed by states.51 They believe that the international 
system will continue to be governed by states, as one of the pinnacles of international 
law is the protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which must be 
safeguarded by the international community regardless of the existence of non-state 
armed groups.52 The establishment of state sovereignty and its protection were further 
codified through the creation and implementation of the UN Charter in 1945, which 
was founded by states to protect states. International law was further developed 
through custom to protect states against non-state armed groups, specifically those 
with terrorizing nature.53 This is assuming that the state is consistently more powerful 
both politically and militarily than a non-state armed group. However, since the 
eruption of the Arab Spring, it is evident that non-state armed groups have had the 
                                                 
49 Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: 
Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law, 37 THE 
YALE J INT’L LAW 1, 107 – 152 (2012).   
50 Id.; Nehal Bhuta, The Role International Actors Other Than States Can Play in the 
New World Order in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Antonio Cassese, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012). 
51 DIRK PULKOWSKI, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIME CONFLICT, 
(OUP Oxford, 2014); MATTHEW HAPPOLD, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A MULTIPOLAR 
WORLD IN ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Routledge, 2013).  
52 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 1; U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4. 
53 See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc.S/Res/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) on Iraq War taken as 
precedence to create a custom of condemning protecting states from the threat of 
terrorism. See The War on Terrorism and Iraq, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, available at 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2005_older/2003/june_ne
ws/columbiatowar, (last visited Apr 1, 2016).  
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ability to mobilize and gain support more vigorously than expected. They have also 
had access to technology and weaponry that is unprecedented, some of which have 
been financed and endorsed by Western countries, effectively causing a more 
complex political dynamic that requires serious attention.54 In that light, the growing, 
if not resurgent,55 power of non-state armed groups cannot be neglected, as their 
presence and power has affected state sovereignty on more than one occasion.  
Non-state armed groups specifically, and NGOs and international 
organizations generally, are therefore equally significant in the international relations 
as states are, as they play a major role in creating the political, economic, and social 
dynamics between states. Each of the roles of non-state armed groups and states must 
be acknowledged and dealt with according to their particular structure and demands. 
This is not to say that the violent acts of non-state armed groups should be met with 
appeasement, but rather it must be acknowledged that their ability to affect 
international politics and compromise state sovereignty is becoming increasingly 
alarming. The attitude that states have towards non-state armed groups as simply a 
byproduct of the system or a violent group that should be met with violence is no 
longer the most effective method of dealing with the present reality. Both parties must 
interact with one another in light of the rising importance of non-state armed 
groups.56  
Therefore, this coordination and integration is essential for the continued 
functioning of the international system and the ability for all entities to have some sort 
of relationship with one another, including humanitarian organizations and non-state 
                                                 
54 See e.g., PATRICK COCKBURN, THE RISE OF ISLAMIC STATE: ISIS AND THE NEW 
SUNNI REVOLUTION (Verso, 2015); J.M. BERGER & JESSICA STERN, ISIS: THE STATE 
OF TERROR (Harper Collins, 2015); HASSAN HASSAN & MICHAEL WEISS, ISIS: INSIDE 
THE ARMY OF TERROR (UPDATED EDITION) (Simon and Schuster, 2016).  
55 Resurgent is used here to depict that the current situation of the emergence of non-
state armed groups is not all that different from those of liberation movements that 
swept across Africa in the mid-20th century. See International Committee of the Red 
Cross [hereinafter ICRC], Understanding Armed Groups and the Applicable Law, 93 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 882, (2011); See generally ANDREA J. DEW AND RICHARD H. 
SHULTZ, INSURGENTS, TERRORISTS, AND MILITIAS: THE WARRIORS OF 
CONTEMPORARY COMBAT (Columbia University Press, 2009); Armed Non-State 
Actors: Current Trends & Future Challenges, (DCAF & Geneva Call, Working Paper 
No. 5, 2015).  
56 Trevin Stratton, Power Failure, 1 INFINITY J 1, (2008); Pierre Calame, Non-State 
Actors and World Governance in World Governance, (2008), available at 
http://www.world-governance.org/rubrique37.html?lang=en.   
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armed groups. Because humanitarian organizations are only able to function through 
state consent, it is imperative that states be willing to integrate non-state armed groups 
within the system so as to achieve that end. The alternative would be to impose upon 
states a reformed system that acknowledges non-state armed groups’ presence without 
requesting their consent. However, this would prove to be an immensely difficult task. 
Therefore, approaching the rise of non-state armed groups through the lens of 
reciprocity between them and humanitarian organizations will support the process of 
reassessing the legal framework governing non-state armed groups. 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
International law has proven to be a double-edged sword in governing the operations 
of UN agencies. On the one hand, it has given agencies the ability to perform their 
operations in crisis situations in the hopes of fulfilling their humanitarian mandate. 
Within this particular context, IHL has provided UN agencies with the platform to 
form agreements with states in order to enter their borders and provide humanitarian 
assistance to their people during times of conflict. It has also granted certain 
protections and immunities for UN agencies and their personnel such as ensuring their 
safety and mobility throughout the conflict areas. More often than not, international 
law has therefore obliged both states and UN agencies to adhere to the provisions that 
regulate their conduct in conflict situations, although there are the rare situations 
where responsibility can be evaded.57 
In other circumstances, however, international law has impeded the operating 
ability of UN agencies. Although there exists a framework that allows humanitarian 
agencies to operate within a state-centric system, it has failed to provide a sufficient 
legal framework governing the conduct of non-state armed groups and their 
interaction with humanitarian agencies. As a result, UN agencies have faced access 
difficulties in areas that are controlled by non-state armed groups.  
A. Non-State Armed Groups under International Law 
After establishing the significance of non-state armed groups in international relations 
and determining the level of effectiveness the UN has in terms of humanitarian aid in 
crisis situations, it is equally important to assess the significance of non-state armed 
groups under the framework of international law. Understanding where international 
law situates non-state armed groups within its provisions will allow for the 
identification of the gaps in the framework that will in turn create a platform for the 
implementation of a reform process. These gaps are identified through the rather 
                                                 
57 There were allegations made of the UN being responsible for the cholera epidemic 
in Haiti, while the UN claimed sovereign immunity to evade responsibility. 
Jacqueline Charles, United Nations Top Official Goes to Haiti to Promote Cholera 
Elimination, Elections, MIAMI HERALD, July 13, 2014, available at 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/haiti/article1975427.
html; Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Res. (CEPR), High-Level Donor Conference on 
Cholera in Haiti Fails to Secure Much Needed Funding, HAITI: RELIEF & 
RECONSTRUCTION WATCH BLOG; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations § 29, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15. 
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pragmatic approach of determining the laws that apply to a particular situation or 
conflict and if there is a significant amount of controversy between legal scholars 
surrounding the law in that context,58 then there is effectively a gap in the system. 
Understanding how international law defines non-state armed groups will support this 
process.  
There is the view that non-state armed groups, under the provisions of 
international law, remain subject to state actions and state jurisdiction under 
international law.59 This means that non-state armed groups should not fall under the 
jurisdiction of international law unless an international crime is committed where the 
act can be attributable to a state. Otherwise, the domestic laws of a state should 
govern the actions of non-state armed groups belonging to that state. This is 
considered a classical view that assumes that non-state armed groups are not active in 
cross-border conflicts. However, in light of the cases of Yemen and Libya 
specifically, the trend that is being witnessed is quite the contrary. Non-state armed 
groups have become an international entity that is generally not attributable to one 
particular state.60 If this narrow definition were used, it would be problematic to 
situate non-state armed groups under the provisions of international law considering 
that several states would be held accountable for the actions of one group of people, 
which seems illogical to say the least. Furthermore, more often than not, the non-state 
armed group that emerges from one state actually opposes that state or is demanding 
independence and became a de facto state, such as in the case of Ukraine, making it 
also unreasonable to hold the contracting state accountable for its actions. Therefore, 
situating non-state armed groups under domestic jurisdiction unless an international 
crime is committed (which is governed by a different set of laws than those of IHL) 
seems implausible.  
                                                 
58 Kelsen argues that there is no situation where no law is applicable. If there is a 
situation where no law seems applicable, this is in reference to a gap purposely 
created in the system that grants permissions or exonerations to particular parties. 
Hans Kelsen, On the Theory of Interpretation, 10 LEGAL STUDIES 2, 127 – 135, 
(1990).  
59 Dayana Jadarian, International Humanitarian Law’s Applicability to Armed Non-
State Actors, UNIVERSITY OF STOCKHOLM, (2007), at 46; See e.g. Roberts & 
Sivakumaran, supra note 49; Frederic Megret, ‘War?’ Legal Semantics and the Move 
to Violence, EJIL, 2002.   
60 Héloïse Ruaudel, Armed Non-State Actors and Displacement in Armed Conflict, 
GENEVA CALL, 2013, at 23.  
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The more convincing approach dictates that non-state armed groups are 
governed by different laws than that of the state’s if they meet certain conditions 
stipulated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 along with their Additional Protocols, 
which govern their responsibilities.61 However, these responsibilities differ according 
to the context of the conflict. The Geneva Conventions will differentiate between 
armed conflicts that are international and those that are non-international. There is an 
importance here to qualify these conflicts as international or non-international 
because this will allow us to determine which laws generally apply to these conflicts, 
which will only apply to all those who are parties to the Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols.62   
B. International and Non-International Armed Conflicts 
International armed conflicts (IAC) are governed by a different set of laws than non-
international armed conflicts (NIAC). Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions 
governs IACs and is considered the traditional type of conflict. It is defined as 
“declared war or any other armed conflict” with “two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties”.63 This also includes armed conflict within occupied territories. Additional 
Protocol I of 1977 adds another scenario to what would qualify as an IAC, which is 
the resistance of national liberation movements against a state under Article 1(4), if 
such a state is party to the treaty.64 The Geneva Conventions as a whole then govern 
the conduct of states in IACs after the conflict has been qualified as such.  
                                                 
61 Expert Meeting on the Right to Light in Armed Conflicts and Situations of 
Occupation, THE UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
September 2005, at 28; Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca, and Stuart Casey-Maslen, 
International Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 93 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS, 881, (2011); Geneva Conventions, common art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, U.N.T.C. 
[hereinafter Common Art. 3]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed 
conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, U.N.T.C. [hereinafter APII].   
62 For the purposes of this study, the next section will assume that the Geneva 
Conventions are not considered customary international law for the purposes of 
analyzing the law as treaty law. Following this section, the Geneva Conventions will 
be treated as customary international law and analyzed through that lens.  
63 Geneva Conventions, supra note 61, at common art. 2.  
64 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to 
the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) [hereinafter 
API], art. 1, para. 4, June 8, 1977.  
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The governance of NIACs is much more limited, as only Common Article 3 
governs the conduct of parties to the conflict. Additional Protocol II should also 
govern the NIAC if this law applies, which is based on very particular conditions. 
Thus, there is a need to understand if a conflict with one or more of the parties is a 
non-state armed group that performs cross-border operations is considered an IAC or 
a NIAC.   
C. Treaty Law  
Looking at the sources of IHL, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional 
Protocols have created a mechanism for governing IACs and NIACs. For these laws 
to apply to a conflict, the parties to the conflict must be parties to the Conventions and 
their Protocols individually. In all three conflicts, the states are State Parties to the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols I and II, with Ukraine also being a 
State Party to Additional Protocol III, and are therefore all applicable to this 
analysis.65 It must be noted, however, that the analysis presented is not restricted to 
these examples, but presents a general understanding of the relationship between 
international law, non-state armed groups, and humanitarian organizations under the 
provisions that apply to State Parties.  
These sources of law have governed the relationship between the state and 
non-state armed groups in certain instances, where combat between both parties is 
regulated. In other instances it has governed the relationship between the law and 
non-state armed groups, where non-state armed groups must adhere to a particular set 
of laws governing their behavior on the ground, although there is yet to be an 
applicable mechanism for holding these groups accountable for violations.66 The issue 
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INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, available at 
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of state-centricity here is important because in both cases, the stipulations presented in 
such frameworks feature the state as the primary actor in the international system. 
International law’s main focus and theoretical inclination towards non-state armed 
groups is two-fold: firstly, it focuses on attributing the acts of non-state armed groups 
to a state67 and secondly, it expects non-state armed groups to adhere to international 
law principles without providing them with the same privileges provided to states.68 
This is not to say that non-state armed groups should be legally equated to states; 
however, it is important to note that international law’s expectation that non-state 
armed groups should be obligated and held accountable under the same conditions as 
those of states is unreasonable, to say the least. That said, these two factors that 
international law has focused on have ultimately directed its attention away from 
improving the framework that governs non-state armed groups in the international 
legal system. 
Regarding the recognition of non-state armed groups under IHL, within the 
general spirit of the Geneva Conventions in both IACs and NIACs,69 it is evident that 
the status of non-state armed groups can only be elevated to insurgents or belligerents 
so as to be granted any legal character, and therefore legal obligations and rights. 
However, these rights are in fact not granted to non-state armed groups. The 
                                                                                                                                            
must say, are not the most effective mechanisms. However, their existence can be 
seen as a viable mechanism of holding states accountable to their actions. Conversely, 
this mechanism is entirely nonexistent for non-state armed groups. See e.g., WOUTER 
VANDENHOLE, CHALLENGING TERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: BUILDING 
BLOCKS FOR A PLURAL AND DIVERSE DUTY-BEARER REGIME, (Routledge: 2015); 
MALCOLM LANGFORD, GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL 
SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
67 International law focuses on attributing the actors of non-state armed groups to the 
state in order to hold accountable a recognized actor under international law. Math 
Noortmann, August Reinisch, and Cedric Ryngaert, Non-State Actors in International 
Law, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015).   
68 Privilege in this context refers to privileges that states acquire when they choose to 
become a part of the international legal system. The system will protect their 
sovereignty, allow for immunities from jurisdiction, provide for the protection of the 
state’s civilians, and protect the state’s territorial integrity, among other aspects. See 
Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1823, (2002).  
69 In this context, because only the general principles of the Geneva Conventions are 
being analyzed and are therefore not limited to the three mentioned conflicts, the 
provisions that govern non-state armed groups in an IAC are also being included. 
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foundation of international law is based on consent and reciprocity,70 which means 
that states give their consent to be bound by international law principles and in return, 
they receive protections and guarantees under international law. In contrast, 
international law obliges non-state armed groups to adhere to some international law 
principles without their expressed consent and does not provide them with the same 
protections and guarantees. Prior to the enactment of the Geneva Conventions and its 
Additional Protocols, non-state armed groups, or rebels, were considered international 
subjects depending on the contracting state’s recognition of them as either insurgents 
or belligerents. Depending on the type of recognition, the group’s international rights 
and obligations were clear under international law: they “became assimilated to a 
state actor with all the attendant rights and obligations which flow from the laws of 
international armed conflict.”71 With the subsequent enactment of the Geneva 
Conventions and their Protocols, non-state armed groups then became automatically 
bound by international obligations under IHL independent of their recognition as 
belligerents.72 
On the other hand, the laws that govern NIACs will bind non-state armed 
groups in situations where the state does not recognize them as insurgents or 
belligerents. If the state were to recognize non-state armed groups as belligerents, 
they would be granted combatant status under the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions, which they are now reluctant to do. States avoid admitting that they 
have lost control over certain areas of land within the state leading them to refuse to 
admit that the conflict is an IAC and grant groups with the status of belligerency 
under international law.73 This is because in IACs, there is an obligation for all parties 
to the conflict to protect civilians and grant prisoners of war their rights under IHL. 
Under the framework of NIACs, there is no privilege for prisoners of war or 
combatant privilege. An individual from a non-state armed group is simply treated as 
                                                 
70 LON. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, (Yale University Press, 1977). Lon L. 
Fuller discusses the importance of reciprocity in any moral exchange. He explains that 
the existence of duties can partly depend on others’ behaviors. The absence of 
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71 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict 
Situations, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 491, 492, (2006).  
72 Id.   
73 Id., at 493. 
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a criminal and tried under national courts. Common Article 3 only provides limited 
protection of these groups.74 This becomes problematic when international 
obligations should be adhered to but rights are not granted to these groups. This lack 
of reciprocity effectively creates a gap in the system, as there can be no obligation on 
a non-state armed group to discriminate between civilian and combatant when 
targeting the opposition without creating the same combatant privilege for the 
members of such a group. Therefore, not only are the laws insufficient but, given the 
current structure of the international legal system, their application is almost 
impossible, hence the non-state armed groups’ lack of adherence to such principles.  
Nevertheless, it is important to assess the laws that govern non-state armed 
groups under the provisions that govern both IACs and NIACs. Specifically regarding 
the provisions that govern IACs, the assessment will be limited to those that address 
“each party to the conflict”75 in the case that the conflict is qualified as an IAC but 
involves a non-state armed group. Provisions that do not address each party to the 
conflict are primarily addressed to states and, for the purposes of this research, it is 
only significant to address articles that apply to non-state armed groups. 
D. The Applicability of the Laws of a NIAC 
Both Common Article 3 and potentially Additional Protocol II may be applied in this 
type of armed conflict.  
a. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
Addressing Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions regarding conflicts not of 
an international character, or in other words a NIAC, the article binds “each Party to 
the conflict” to apply provisions regarding the protection of persons who no longer 
take part in the hostility and treat them in a humane manner without discrimination.76 
It prohibits particular acts that both parties must refrain from committing, among 
other provisions. The importance of this article is that it binds all parties to the 
conflict, to which states have consented to being bound by. There are several issues 
with the applicability of this article. The first is, as mentioned, the conventional nature 
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76 Geneva Conventions, supra note 61, at common art. 3.  
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of the article, which assumes that the NIAC will be contained within the state and will 
thus only include a government in conflict with a militia group. This disregards the 
possibility of the non-state armed group emerging from another state, or several 
groups combatting several governments. The second issue is that non-state armed 
groups, as opposed to states, have not given their consent to be bound by such a 
provision and because the Geneva Conventions are state-centric, there is no 
accountability clause that applies to non-state armed groups. It can be assumed that 
non-state armed groups would only adhere to international law principles if they were 
being granted rights under these laws, or if they were to be held accountable for 
violations through some sort of penalizing mechanism. Both of these options are not 
present in the current legal system. Any sort of penalizing such as the imposition of 
sanctions will ultimately affect the state in which the non-state armed group resides 
and its population, causing harm on the state and its people who may not even be 
involved in the conflict.  
 With regards to Common Article 3(2), the provision binds all parties to the 
conflict to allow “an impartial humanitarian body”77 to offer its services to the 
wounded and sick of the parties to the conflict. Although this article is quite vague, 
this means that both states and non-state armed groups should allow the humanitarian 
organization to support populations in need. However, as mentioned, it is unlikely that 
the non-state armed group would adhere to such a provision, as it has not consented to 
being bound by such laws. Furthermore, the article provides that the parties to the 
conflict should attempt to “bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or 
part of the other provisions of the present Convention”. It also adds “The application 
of the preceding provision shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the 
conflict.” This is quite contradictory of the idea of a NIAC, where the non-state armed 
group is not considered a legitimate force and is therefore unable to enter into 
agreements. This is further reaffirmed by the fact that applying these provisions will 
not alter the non-state armed group’s legal personality. The law is therefore insisting 
that non-state armed groups will remain illegitimate and unrecognized as an entity 
other than an illegal combatant. Hence, it is not surprising that non-state armed groups 
would not adhere to such a provision.   
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b. Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions 
Regarding the application of Additional Protocol II (AP II), there are stringent laws 
that allow for the applicability of the Protocol. Firstly, the state where the NIAC is 
taking place should be a State Party to AP II. Secondly, the non-state armed group or 
rebel group must be in control of a significant portion of the territory within the state. 
In all three conflicts discussed, the three states are all State Parties of the Protocol.78 
Furthermore, as presented, non-state armed groups in all three conflicts have 
significant control over territories within the state. Therefore, AP II’s provisions 
would apply to all three conflicts. It is important to note that AP II attempts to impose 
all of the regulations of an IAC in a NIAC with several exceptions that do not apply to 
a NIAC because of its nature as a predominantly domestic conflict.  
Under Article 3 of the Protocol, there is a provision of non-intervention by 
other states in order to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state in 
which the conflict is taking place. This article is quite controversial because it 
assumes that there is no justification for intervention in the conflict. However, as will 
be discussed in the coming section, there are situations where a state may intervene in 
a NIAC with the consent of the government. The idea for non-intervention is for the 
third party state to refrain from impeding the contracting state’s sovereignty; 
therefore, if the contracting state provides its consent for the third party state to 
intervene, it is therefore willingly giving up its sovereignty to the other state.79  
The same is not true if the third party state is intervening on behalf of the non-
state armed group because, in this case, the non-state armed group is combatting the 
state and if the third party state is intervening on its behalf it is, therefore, also 
combatting the state. This would turn the conflict into a conflict between two states 
and would eventually be qualified as an IAC. It must be noted that this situation 
assumes a strict identity between the regime and the state. During a civil war, this 
identity is necessarily challenged. Therefore, this situation would be controversial 
when assessing a case such as Libya’s, where there is a divide regarding the 
                                                 
78 Yemen and Ukraine ratified Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions in 
1990 and Libya ratified it in 1978. This can be found at, Treaties, State Parties, and 
Commentaries, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStat
esParties&xp_treatySelected=475 (last visited Mar 18, 2016).  
79 APII, supra note 61, at art. 3. 
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recognition of the legitimate government. Again, there is a further gap in the legal 
system, whereby it is assumed that the differentiation between state and rebel groups 
will be clearly identified as such, which the situation in Libya has proven is rarely the 
case. International law, therefore, does not attend to a situation where the legitimacy 
of the regime is challenged and the identity of the state is skewed. Therefore, this 
provision somehow results in the protection of the internationally recognized regime 
(which in the Libya case is the Western-recognized) and its sovereignty as it is 
identified as the contracting state, effectively disregarding the rights of the non-state 
armed group and making it biased towards the state. This further affirms the argument 
of the state-centricity of international law, which should be reformed to incorporate 
the rights of non-state armed groups in order to facilitate fairness in the application of 
the laws. This would benefit UN agencies in such that it may provide incentives for 
non-state armed groups to begin adhering to such principles. 
Article 4 of the Protocol imposes fundamental guarantees on the parties to the 
conflict to ensure that those who are not taking part in the hostilities should be treated 
humanely. Both the state and non-state armed groups should adhere to this provision; 
however, in all three crises, both parties violate this provision incessantly by 
undertaking violent acts against those who are not directly taking part in hostilities 
and do not provide children with the care and aid that they require. The issue here is 
that there is no method of accountability to hold non-state armed groups to.80 If the 
state adheres to this principle, the non-state armed group may not reciprocate. This 
reinstates the idea that non-state armed groups have not consented to being bound by 
such a provision. Instead, the provisions that the contracting state has consented to are 
applied to non-state armed groups who are criminalized for violating them. Through a 
human rights perspective, this is of course ideal, considering that these provisions 
should always be upheld in order to safeguard the lives of individuals who are not 
considered combatants. However, from a legal perspective, the system does not entitle 
non-state armed groups to the same rights as that of the state and should therefore is 
unrealistic for assuming that the same obligations should be adhered to. In this case, 
UN agencies are unable to receive their right to attend to the needs of affected 
populations because the system does not provide the state’s rights to non-state armed 
groups and their theoretical obligations are therefore not adhered to.  
                                                 
80 See supra note 65 for examples on mechanisms for state accountability.  
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Looking at Article 5 of the Protocol, it imposes guarantees for those who have 
been deprived of their liberty as a result of the armed conflict. It also adds in Article 
1(b) that affected persons should “be provided with food and drinking water and be 
afforded safeguards as regards health and hygiene…” and in Article 1(d) “they shall 
be allowed to receive individual or collective relief”. Because the article does not 
specify who should be providing this type of aid, it insinuates that humanitarian 
organizations could be those undertake this responsibility. They should therefore be 
granted access to provide relief to those whose liberties have been restricted, and this 
should apply to both the state and non-state armed groups.  
Part IV of the Protocol, specifically Articles 13 – 18, ensures the protection of 
the civilian population. It is essentially an emulation of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention on the protection of civilians. This article should apply to both the state 
and the non-state armed group; therefore, the non-state armed group should ensure 
that it is adhering to the principle of distinction between civilian and combatant. In 
reality, specifically in the three crises discussed, this does not happen. Both states and 
non-state armed groups, more often than not, violate the principle of distinction and 
do not protect civilians, much like their violations of Article 4. As a member state, 
there is a mechanism of accountability regarding their actions, which includes being 
sanctioned by the Security Council as they see fit. However, there is no method of 
international accountability for non-state armed groups under the Protocol. Although 
sanctions could greatly harm a non-state armed group within a particular territory, 
these sanctions would be imposed on the state as a whole, which, as mentioned in the 
previous section, would affect the entire population and is therefore not an effective 
mechanism of accountability. Ideally, the state’s national courts should try them; 
however, when the conflicts become so severe as those in Yemen, Libya, and 
Ukraine, and in light of the groups’ rising power, it becomes very difficult to try 
criminals in domestic courts. Therefore, this element within the governance of the 
conduct of non-state actors should be revisited. The adherence of non-state armed 
groups to the principle of distinction would benefit UN agencies in such that it would 
ultimately alleviate the severity of the conflict on affected populations, which would 
highly support the UN’s mandate. In addition, regarding access, if a non-state armed 
group is adhering to the principle of distinction in order to protect civilians, it can be 
assumed that they will be inclined to provide access to UN agencies to attend to the 
needs of their populations.  
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Article 18 specifically addresses relief societies and relief actions, whereby it states 
in clause 1 that humanitarian organizations “may offer their services for the 
performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed 
conflict”. Furthermore, Article 18(2) states that:  
If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack 
of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and 
medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are 
of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are 
conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken 
subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.81 
 
This article is directly applicable to the issue being discussed. It explicitly mentions 
that humanitarian organizations should be granted access to the territory for the 
purposes of attending to the medical and nutritional needs of the affected civilian 
population. This is limited to the consent of the contracting party without taking into 
account a scenario where the non-state armed group may be in control of a particular 
part of that territory. Theoretically, the humanitarian agency should not be requesting 
access to any part of the territory from any actor other than the government because of 
this particular provision. However, this has proven to cause several practical 
challenges for UN agencies including access. This is not to assume that the situation 
is uncontroversial; on the contrary, legal provisions restrict UN agencies’ ability to 
recognize non-state armed groups let alone obtain consent to enter their territory. At 
the same time, it is impractical to assume that UN agencies will not request access 
from non-state armed groups in order to distribute their aid. In that situation, UN 
agencies are still limited by this provision and all other provisions specifically 
ensuring state sovereignty is not impeded. This is a clearly identifiable gap in the 
system whereby the law does not explicitly bind non-state armed groups to adhere to 
granting access to UN agencies and UN agencies are simultaneously bound by the 
principles of maintaining state sovereignty.  
 Bearing these provisions in mind, it must be noted that there is a significant 
gap in the applicability of the law that governs NIACs with regards to the conduct of 
non-state armed groups. This is because the law is predominantly state-centric and 
therefore disregards the rights that the non-state armed groups should be entitled to if 
they are to be bound by the same obligations. It is also important to note that non-state 
                                                 
81 APII, supra note 61, at art. 18, para. 2.  
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armed groups have not consented to be bound by these provisions and it is therefore 
not surprising that they have not consistently adhered to them. Finally, UN agencies 
must adhere to a set of obligations that restricts their interaction with non-state armed 
groups outside of the state-centric setting. This becomes even more difficult in a 
conflict where Additional Protocol II does not apply. This would mean that Common 
Article 3 is the only article that governs the NIAC, which is quite limited by essence. 
UN agencies are still bound in principle to a state-centric system, but non-state armed 
groups are then bound to generic provisions that insist that their legal personality will 
not change.  
 After addressing the gaps in the legal system that governs NIACs, and 
considering that it is possible for an armed conflict involving a non-state actor to be 
considered an IAC, it is important to assess the legal framework that governs non-
state armed groups in an IAC.  
E. The Applicability of the Laws of an IAC 
All of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions should apply to IACs. However, 
considering that the study is limited to the applicability of non-state actors, as 
mentioned, only the articles that address all parties to the conflict will be studied. But 
first it is important to understand if the involvement of non-state armed groups in a 
conflict may still qualify as an IAC.  
Looking at the applicability of Common Article 2 that governs IACs, the 
article restricts the definition of such a conflict to states, so it must be determined 
whether non-state armed groups would be given the same legal characteristics as the 
state. Under the general provisions of the Geneva Conventions, non-state armed 
groups are simply persons carrying arms. The terminology of the law does not 
specifically distinguish between civilians and non-state armed groups, but 
distinguishes between those carrying arms and those not carrying arms. Those not 
carrying arms during an armed conflict should be protected by IHL, whilst persons 
carrying arms who are not part of the state security apparatus are considered illegal 
combatants and are given the status of insurgents or belligerents depending on the 
state’s recognition of the group as previously mentioned. The status of belligerency is 
also governed under international law. But, as noted, the status of belligerency is only 
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limited to IACs.82 Hence, it is evident that the criterion for an IAC is not applicable to 
non-state armed groups in this instance and specifically within the three cases 
presented. They are therefore not granted the status of belligerency. Furthermore, 
Common Article 2 is not applicable to these groups, as they are not considered state 
parties for several reasons, which include that they do not fit the criteria of statehood 
and they have not signed or ratified any treaties that would grant them the same rights 
or obligations as a state.  
With regards to provisions that govern IACs that bind each party to the 
conflict, Article 45 of the First Geneva Convention and Article 46 of the Second 
Geneva Convention state, “Each Party to the conflict, acting through its commanders-
in-chief, shall ensure the detailed execution of the preceding Articles…” However, 
the preceding articles with the Geneva Conventions do not all apply to non-state 
armed groups, even if the conflict is classified as an IAC. For example, Article 17 of 
the Third Geneva Convention binds each party to the conflict with regards to the 
questioning of prisoners insofar as the conflict is international. This is because it 
assumes that any prisoners of war are captured combatants of the opposing state’s 
armed forces. This is not the case in a conflict that involves non-state armed groups, 
as the armed group is not classified as a state. Any captured prisoners from a non-
state armed group would not be considered a prisoner of war considering they do not 
qualify as such under Common Article 4. Although under Common Article 4(2), 
prisoners of war may be classified as those who are “members of other militias and 
members of other volunteer corps”, they must be attributed to a party to the conflict 
and fulfill stringent conditions, most notably the conditions of “having a fixed 
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance”83 and “conducting their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war”.84 These conditions are in many cases 
not applicable to the particular conflict, which is in fact the case in several conflicts 
studied. Regardless of the applicability of such a provision, the adherence to such an 
article (or lack thereof) will not affect the access constraints that UN agencies face. 
They are simply a reflection of the inapplicability of a significant number of laws to a 
conflict that involve non-state armed groups.  
                                                 
82 Solis, supra note 74, at 150 – 152.  
83 Geneva Conventions, supra note 61, at common art. 4, para. 2b. 
84 Id., at common art. 4, para. 2d.  
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Because it has become difficult to categorize the conflict, it is equally difficult 
to apply the relevant laws. Even if the conflict qualified as an IAC, this would only be 
the case because of the involvement of another state within the conflict, and the 
provisions of IHL would apply to the two states and not the non-state armed group. 
Thus, there could actually be two conflicts simultaneously occurring: a NIAC 
between the rebels and the government, and an IAC between two states. The laws that 
govern the NIAC would theoretically be the only laws that the non-state armed group 
would be bound by.   
However, we are still faced with difficulty in applying the laws of a NIAC 
when a non-state armed group practices cross-border operations, or its activities 
become so extensive that it involves more than one non-state armed group within 
several territories and international personalities. At the same time, it is inaccurate to 
apply the laws of an IAC on non-state armed groups because they are not considered 
states and are therefore not afforded similar rights or obligations. The inability to 
qualify such a conflict is what leads to the inability to apply the correct laws. The 
Tadić case of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
provides a reference for the qualification of conflicts that involve non-state armed 
groups.85 It is evident that a conflict will be considered a NIAC if it involves the 
government of a state and rebels within the territory of the state. If a second state 
intervenes in a NIAC, it can only do so with the consent of the government. The 
conflict will remain a NIAC because both states will become one party to the conflict 
against a rebel group. This is the mainstream opinion of scholars who believe that this 
type of conflict is still a NIAC because it involves non-state actors who do not qualify 
as states and therefore may not possess their international character.86 On the other 
hand, if a state intervenes on behalf of the rebel group, the conflict becomes an IAC 
with dual nature,87 because the second state intervened without the consent of the 
state where the conflict is occurring. In this case, there are two states in conflict and 
the laws of an IAC apply. This type of qualification accurately illustrates the ways in 
                                                 
85 United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
Tadić (IT-94-1), (1995). 
86 Solis, supra note 74.  
87 This refers to an IAC that has NIAC characteristics because of the involvement of 
non-state armed groups. ICRC, supra note 55.  
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which the system of international law is greatly state centric. The qualification of the 
conflict is predominantly based on where the state is situated within the conflict.  
F. The Applicability of Both Doctrines 
In a situation where a non-state armed group is intervening in a conflict between a 
state and another non-state armed group, such as in Libya, international law is unable 
to qualify such a conflict. Or if the scenario includes that more than one non-state 
armed group originate from different states and are in conflict with rebel groups and 
the government of another state, international law is still unable to qualify this 
conflict. The Ukrainian conflict may be qualified as an IAC, considering Russia 
intervened on behalf of the rebels against the Ukrainian government; however, when 
Russian troops withdrew and the conflict continued between the rebels and the 
Ukrainian government, it is still difficult to qualify the conflict as a NIAC. This is 
because the separatists continue to receive political and financial assistance from 
Russia88 and some states recognize the separatists to be independent.89  
Consequently, it is more convincing to consider a conflict that involves 
several non-state armed groups and a group of states both a NIAC and an IAC. Some 
interpretations have assumed that these types of conflict are called “transnational 
                                                 
88 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 181, 1986, at 14, where “effective control” meant 
that there should be direct control over the group. This is contrasted with the ICTY 
Tadić case (supra note 85) of “overall control” without being specific to the type of 
control, meaning financial support could be a method of legitimate control. However, 
in 2003, the ICJ revisited the definition of control in the case of the Oil Platforms 
(Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, where they reinstated the idea of “effective control” 
applied in Nicaragua. Therefore, it is questionable in this case whether financial 
assistance from Russia would qualify the conflict as an IAC or a NIAC.  
89 There is an importance in differentiating between recognizing the separatists as 
independent and providing them with the title of statehood. The separatists are not 
recognized as separate states, as they do not qualify as states under international law 
according to the Montevideo Convention of 1933: Montevideo Convention on Rights 
and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. 881. However, Russia and 
South Ossetia recognize the separatists as independent and no longer a part of 
Ukraine, hence the controversy in considering the conflict an IAC or a NIAC. South 
Ossetia recognizes Donetsk People's Republic. KYIVPOST. Jun 27, 2014. 
http://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine/south-ossetia-recognizes-donetsk-
peoples-republic-353815.html, (last visited May 8, 2016); Carol J. Williams, Russia 
Recognizes Ukraine Separatists, Provoking New Sanctions Threat. LOS ANGELES 
TIMES. Nov 3, 2014. http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-ukraine-russia-
separatists-recognized-20141103-story.html. 
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armed conflicts”,90 where there is armed conflict between non-state actors across 
borders. In this case, international law could attempt to apply both the laws of IACs 
and NIACs simultaneously; however, there are several issues with applying doctrines 
simultaneously. The first is that some laws may contradict one another because the 
parties will be operating at different standards.  
For example, states are bound by the protection of civilians under the Fourth 
Geneva Convention whilst if Additional Protocol II does not apply in a particular 
conflict, the non-state armed group may not be equally bound by the same provisions. 
The clearest example is the one that this paper discusses, whereby states are bound by 
ensuring humanitarian access for organizations, and while international law 
theoretically binds non-state armed groups to certain provisions in an IAC or a NIAC, 
ensuring humanitarian access for organizations is not one of them. As mentioned, 
under Article 18 of APII, the High Contracting Party is the party that provides consent 
for the humanitarian organization to enter the territory and provide assistance to the 
civilian population. The law mentions nothing about the territory that falls under the 
control of a non-state armed group. Although this is technically still considered the 
territory of the state, it is unwise to assume that the non-state armed group will adhere 
to the provisions directed towards the state that effectively empowers the state during 
conflict. Practically and realistically, there remains areas of state territory controlled 
by non-state armed groups and because of the structure of the law being state-centric, 
it does not provide for any regulations that theoretically or practically bind non-state 
armed groups to provide access to humanitarian organizations.  In any event, even if 
such a law exists, there is difficulty in binding non-state armed groups to it 
considering, again, the nature of the system that involves a lack of reciprocity with 
non-state armed groups whether the laws applied are those of an IAC or a NIAC. For 
these reasons, it is even more difficult to consider the conflict both an IAC and a 
                                                 
90 See e.g., Geoffrey Corn & Eric T. Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A 
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NIAC. This shows that the doctrine for governing non-state armed groups under IHL 
is both insufficient and practically inapplicable.  
While there are several modes of attempting to govern non-state armed 
groups, they have not been successful in ensuring that UN agencies are able to access 
populations in NGCAs in order to fulfill their mandate. In particular to all three cases 
of Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine that were previously discussed, militia groups control 
certain pockets of land in their countries and are either asking for independence, 
control of the government, or are fighting for a particular cause or belief. When 
international law classifies these cases as IACs and/or NIACs based on the criteria 
stipulated in the Geneva Conventions, certain laws will apply to each case where 
there are benefits and responsibilities for all parties, including humanitarian agencies. 
Under IHL, the state has obligations towards humanitarian agencies, whereas the 
provisions of IHL only govern non-state armed groups’ relations with the state or with 
the law, and even then, these regulations are insufficient. At the same time, 
humanitarian agencies are strictly bound by international law principles making it 
difficult for them to interact with non-state armed groups in a legal setting, as non-
state armed groups are not reciprocally bound.91 This is because humanitarian 
agencies are in a position of institutional constraints, whereby there is high 
importance in maintaining the reputation of a humanitarian agency and ensuring that 
their mandate remains neutral and by the book of international law so as to ensure that 
as many states as possible cooperate with them. This constrains them from being able 
to interact with non-state armed groups, as in several situations the state may sever its 
ties with the organization claiming that it possesses political affiliations with the 
enemy of the state.92 
This is where the obstacle of access presents itself in international law. 
Through these case studies, these obstacles are portrayed and have allowed for a 
clearer perception of what needs to be amended in the legal framework that governs 
non-state armed groups in order to make it more applicable to crisis situations. The 
ultimate goal of these amendments is to provide an avenue for UN agencies to legally 
interact with non-state armed groups whilst somehow ensuring that non-state armed 
                                                 
91 Fuller, supra note 70. 
92 CLAUDIA HOFMANN, ENGAGING NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN HUMANITARIAN 
ACTION. STATE ACTOR AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL APPROACHES, (German 
Development Institute, 2004). 
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groups will adhere to some, if not all, IHL principles. Reaching this goal would allow 
for UN agencies to be granted access to NGCAs and would also hold non-state armed 
groups accountable for their actions towards UN agencies. This would be for the 
purposes of protecting UN agencies and their personnel in NCGAs whilst 
simultaneously allowing them to access populations in need, hence the importance of 
the reciprocity of the system.  
However, there is an argument made by some international lawyers that the 
laws that govern armed conflicts as a whole are considered customary international 
law and should apply to all conflicts, whether it is international or non-international. 
This also means that these laws should bind all parties, including non-state armed 
groups.93 Other scholars argue the contrary. In the next section, several views will be 
presented on whether considering these laws custom will resolve the issue of their 
insufficiency and inapplicability.  
G. Customary International Law 
There exist several perspectives regarding non-state armed groups’ obligations under 
the framework of customary international law. It suggests that the current legal 
framework that governs armed conflicts applies to non-state armed groups, as it falls 
under customary international law principles that non-state armed groups are required 
to adhere to.94 This insinuates that access challenges faced by UN agencies exist due 
to the lack of adherence of non-state armed groups to the general principles enshrined 
under customary international law and not because these principles do not exist. Some 
of these principles include that all parties to the conflict should ensure the protection 
of civilians, adhere to the principle of distinction, and ensure access and safety to 
                                                 
93 Should the Obligations of States and Armed Groups Under International 
Humanitarian Law Really Be Equal? 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 
425 – 436, (Marco Sassòli & Yuval Shany eds., 2011). 
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humanitarian agencies and their personnel, among other principles.95 In other words, 
non-state armed groups do not necessarily have to be bound by the treaties that 
govern IHL because customary international law itself holds them accountable. The 
violations of such principles are therefore a reflection of the bad conduct of non-state 
armed groups rather than a measurement of the effectiveness of the current 
framework governing their behavior.96 This is similar to the view of those discussing 
UN effectiveness, where it is argued that the obstacles of UN agencies are attributable 
to the conduct of non-state armed groups themselves rather than the level of UN 
effectiveness. Regardless of this attribution, this perspective maintains that the 
framework governing non-state armed groups’ conduct falls under customary 
international principles, and the obstacles faced by UN agencies are a result of bad 
politics and not gaps in the law.97   
However, the practical situation of UN operations has proven that although 
there are attempts to bind non-state armed groups to international law principles 
through customary international law, there remains an access issue for UN agencies in 
conflict areas. There are a majority of non-state armed groups that are currently not 
adhering to principles that grant UN agencies access. This perspective takes on a 
more pragmatic approach and suggests that the reason that non-state armed groups do 
not adhere to the principles of customary international law is because they were not 
involved in the process of creating them.98  Customary international law is created 
through state practice and opinio juris,99 which disregards the practices of non-state 
armed groups. Therefore, non-state armed groups do not feel a sense of obligation 
towards these laws and are consequently not inclined to follow them.  
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Again, this assumes that the cohesiveness of the identity of the regime and the 
state. However, the regimes that were involved in the negotiations of the Geneva 
Conventions in 1949 are no longer the same actors today, yet the state remains bound 
by such provisions. Therefore, the actions of the regimes nowadays can be considered 
customary international law and will change over time, which may or may not involve 
non-state armed groups’ actions. But the most prevalent aspect that has consistently 
been a challenge to the application of law on non-state armed groups is the absence of 
reciprocity of obligations and rights for non-state armed groups. The same applies to 
non-member states, where the provisions of custom are theoretically applied to states 
who are not party to the treaties. In this case, the same contradictions apply to non-
member states, where their involvement in creating custom in this context is 
inexistent and there is therefore no reciprocity in the system where obligations 
imposed on non-member states will be faced with rights granted to them.  
Looking at the situation on the ground, if one could argue that the general 
principles that apply to an IAC should apply to non-state armed groups because they 
are considered customary law principles, in practice non-state armed groups would 
not adhere to international law principles specifically those of an IAC if they were not 
being granted the same rights as states in exchange for obligations.  This is where it is 
reasonable to say that there is a gap in the system of governance of non-state armed 
groups, which need to be reassessed.100 In addition, non-state armed groups are 
considerably unaware of these principles, as they have not been integrated into the 
system of the knowledge of international law.101 Thus, the existence of customary 
international law’s governance of the conduct of non-state armed groups is of little 
consequence to the reality of their actions and therefore the reality of the access 
challenges that UN agencies face. 
Despite this seemingly pessimistic reality, non-state armed groups could 
potentially adhere to the principles of customary international law if there was a legal 
framework that integrated them within the system. This ultimately means that they 
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should become recognized actors in global affairs.102 This does not mean that non-
state armed groups should be equated to states in responsibility and obligation, but 
rather there should have their own separate framework that is tailored to their needs 
and the needs of the international system. Therefore, what is suggested is a system of 
reciprocity between international law and the non-state armed groups, whereby 
international law grants non-state armed groups particular rights and non-state armed 
groups are required to adhere to fundamental principles in international law. 
Although this paper argues that the reason for the UN’s access challenges to 
certain regions in conflict is due to the insufficiencies of the current legal framework 
governing non-state armed groups, it is equally important to assess the role of the UN 
as an organization in conflict situations. It must be recognized that there lies a 
complementary argument for their challenges, which suggests that a reason for 
agencies’ access drawbacks is the level of the UN’s ineffectiveness as an 
organization. The UN’s executive and operational role in conflict situations has been 
shaped by the political dynamics of the international system and has therefore played 
a major role in causing access challenges for agencies. This is because such political 
dynamics have greatly affected the current state-centric structure of international law 
and the way in which it is is being implemented on the ground. As a result, this has 
caused several inefficiencies in interacting with non-state armed groups, eventually 
causing a gap in the system.   
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V. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
As has been generally discussed in the case studies aforementioned, the role of the 
United Nations in the issue of UN agencies’ access challenges is quite significant. 
The UN has proven to have both a positive and negative impact on the ability for UN 
agencies to access populations in need. Its role has also affected the implementation 
of international law principles and the stagnancy of the laws that govern non-state 
armed groups. UN effectiveness on the executive and operational levels have been 
continuously questioned in crisis situations. There are those who believe that the UN 
has failed in effectiveness due to its executive structure, what with the UNSC’s 
permanent five members spearheading any and all matters related to conflict 
situations. In addition, the UN faces operational challenges, which have failed to 
eradicate the most pressing global issues including humanitarian needs in conflict 
situations. Both these extremes are valid on several accounts and are flawed in others. 
Nevertheless, it is important to examine the ways in which the UN’s benefits and 
drawbacks affect the challenges that are faced by UN agencies in addition to the 
political influence of states that affect the UN’s impact on the legal framework that 
govern non-state armed groups.  
A. Challenges of the United Nations System 
There is a variety of scholarly work on the challenges of the UN system, each with a 
different perspective on the reasons behind the challenges that face UN agencies. One 
perspective on this issue is that UN agency operations have been ineffective in 
dealing with crisis situations due to their inherent operational challenges, which can 
be argued are independent of the scope of international law frameworks.103 It is 
believed that UN agencies are inefficient within themselves due to their management 
system and their general strategies that constrain them from being able to attend to all 
those in need, which is irrespective of the current legal framework governing non-
state armed groups. Like any organization, UN agencies are led by the expertise of 
individuals, who are not free from committing errors in judgment such as prioritizing 
certain global issues over others or deciding to approach an operational challenge in 
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an incorrect manner.104 There are also structural challenges that the UN faces 
including overlapping mandates within several agencies causing a large number of 
inefficiencies.105 Furthermore, it cannot be neglected that in the both the higher and 
lower level bodies of the UN there are concerns of wastefulness, inefficiencies, 
corruption, inefficient management structures or promotion strategies, and in some 
cases, sexual abuse of vulnerable populations.106  
 On the executive level, the mere structure of the UNSC alone causes 
stagnancy in the provisions of the governance of non-state armed groups, let alone the 
authorization of intervention leading to the intensification of conflicts on the hands of 
the UNSC. On several occasions, the UNSC has authorized interventions in conflict 
situations that have resulted in the worsening of the conflict as opposed to restoring 
peace and security. Furthermore, the General Assembly has proven to be less than 
effective in situations where there is a deadlock between members of the UNSC. 
Despite several of these disadvantages that the UN possesses, there are a number of 
benefits that the UN has brought about the international system.  
B. Benefits of the United Nations System 
Considering the UN’s track record in attending to the needs of affected populations in 
conflict situations,107 it is evident that although the mentioned inefficiencies may 
exist, the UN’s protocols for dealing with such situations have proven more effective 
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than many other actors. UN agencies’ operational strategies take into account the 
potential structural or institutional inefficiencies that may arise through the 
implementation of contingency plans and risk registers.108 Furthermore, UN agencies 
have been of the most effective international organizations to address the needs of 
populations with regards to health, nutrition, protection, and displacement.109 The 
argument of UN ineffectiveness is heavily based on executive inefficiencies from the 
part of the UNSC or the General Assembly in effectively ending a conflict or holding 
a particular party accountable for violations under IHL. These are mostly based on 
political interests that govern the highest level of bodies in the UN. This is not 
necessarily true for lower level bodies that simply aid populations in needs whilst 
attempting to be as neutral and impartial as possible.110 Although there have been 
situations where humanitarian workers have caused irreparable damage to affected 
populations,111 this is yet to be proven as the norm in such a setting.  
Furthermore, there is the argument that places the burden of UN agencies’ 
challenges completely on international law alone. It claims that international law is 
responsible for crippling the ability for humanitarian agencies to execute their 
operations in several ways including the issue of the governance of non-state armed 
groups.112 This view insists that the single reason for the challenges that UN agencies 
face is the current legal framework that they operate in and that this framework is 
insufficient in providing gateways for humanitarian agencies to support conflict-
affected populations. However, this perspective is ultimately flawed in such that it 
assumes that international law is applied perfectly as prescribed by the books. But 
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international law does not operate in a vacuum and human errors are bound to occur. 
This is why it is important to balance both the view of partial ineffectiveness of UN 
agencies with the idea that international law limits the UN’s ability to access certain 
regions governed by non-state armed groups. 
In that light, international law has in many ways protected humanitarian 
agencies on the ground through providing stipulations that ensure that states provide 
the necessary access and protection for humanitarian personnel and their convoys in 
situations of conflict, although there are several incidents where this has not been the 
case. It also demands that parties to the conflict ensure that humanitarian 
organizations are not targeted during armed conflict. The access challenges can also 
be attributed to the violent conduct of non-state armed groups themselves. It is 
therefore the responsibility of the agencies to ensure the cooperation of non-state 
armed groups within the limits of international law.113  
The independent views on the effectiveness of both the UN and international 
law, while valid on several accounts, are not sufficient alone. Through analyzing the 
propositions, elements of each can be combined to provide an accurate perception of 
the reality concerning the reasons behind UN agencies’ inability to pursue their access 
strategies to the fullest. Inefficiencies are bound to happen; yet UN agencies in their 
operational capacity have shown, strictly through their operations to distribute 
humanitarian aid, considerable effort in attempting to alleviate these inefficiencies. At 
the same time, international law has not provided the best of platforms for UN 
agencies to operate within specifically when they are forced to interact with non-state 
armed groups under laws that do not articulate a detailed method of how their 
mandate can be fulfilled. UN agencies have somewhat relied on their own expertise 
and negotiation skills to be granted access to restricted areas, all within the limits of 
the law. However, the unpredictability and fluctuation of gaining access to restricted 
regions, specifically those in the mentioned conflict areas, is what leads UN agencies 
to facing these drawbacks. This unpredictability is a result of the lack of 
comprehensive legal framework needed to consistently maintain a certain standard of 
interaction between humanitarian organizations and non-state armed groups.   
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VI. LEGAL REFORM 
There is an urgent need for legal reform in IHL. Presenting a system of reciprocity 
between international law and non-state armed groups would greatly benefit UN 
agencies in fulfilling their mandates. Legal reform would offer a plausible solution to 
the lack of adherence to customary international law by non-state armed groups. This 
necessitates that non-state armed groups are granted a mechanism to become 
decision-makers within the legal system and in return will be held accountable for 
violating the principles they have agreed to, inclusive of customary principles. Under 
this view, it can be argued that if this mechanism is implemented, UN agencies will 
be given more opportunities to create dialogue with non-state armed groups and will 
be granted further access to NGCAs. Current customs have not yet taken this reality 
into account and should therefore adapt to the changing nature of the international 
system, which is the principle argument of this research. It is equally important to 
implement operational reforms in the UN, which would run parallel with the legal 
reforms. Creating an environment with a higher level of accountability for UN 
agencies, alongside the reformation of the current legal and political structures that 
govern non-state armed groups would ultimately alleviate the access challenges that 
these agencies face. Such a process is a significantly difficult task and requires a 
change in the way that politics and international law approach non-state armed 
groups.  
A. Changing the Approach 
The proposition of reform is not only based on amending the laws and creating 
new customs, which requires an elongated process of state practice and cooperation, 
but rather it is also based on attempting to revolutionize the approach that states, 
scholars, and lawyers take when addressing non-state armed groups in an armed 
conflict. The immediate classification instilled on non-state armed groups who 
demand independence or cessation is a reactionary one, which assumes that there is a 
threat on the regime’s legitimacy, state sovereignty, or territorial integrity that must 
be contained. This kind of approach should be reformed for many reasons including 
that the result of this exclusion is that UN agencies face obstacles when dealing with 
non-state armed groups. This is not to say that changing the way in which the 
international community approaches the legal or political position of non-state armed 
groups is an easy task. On the contrary, it is much more difficult than changing state 
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or organizational policies or interpretations of law. Altering the provisions of IHL as a 
whole and its general principles in order to create a balance of centricity between the 
state and non-state armed groups is hardly among popular thought in state ideologies 
or within international organizations. However, because international law should 
ideally be the foundation of state actions and the actions of the international 
community, it is imperative that this reform be considered at minimum. Policy 
alterations, while effective in particular situations, are still only effective inasmuch as 
the situation allows. Policies can be frequently changed and are somewhat arbitrary 
according to the time and place they are being applied. They also greatly differ 
between states and are therefore quite heterogeneous. The idea of altering the 
approach to the way in which non-state armed groups are governed would create a 
homogenous structure that should be adhered to by entire international community, 
although this process would prove to be more difficult considering the potential need 
for state consent. Furthermore, because of the frequency of policy alterations, they 
hold less accountability than a change in law.  
However, Thomas Franck would argue that the formal status of the law is the least 
aspect that determines the behavior of individuals and institutions,114 which is 
understandable considering the immense violations of international law that both 
individuals and institutions commit, as is seen by the examples of Yemen, Libya, and 
Ukraine, among others. Yet, these violations are also a factor of the ways in which 
law is constructed to benefit those who use it as a tool to further political and 
economic gains. Therefore, the purpose of altering the legal framework that governs 
non-state armed groups aims to diminish the ability for institutions to utilize, if not 
manipulate, the principles of international law to further their benefits and in the 
process create an unfairness in international law. However, as mentioned, legal 
reform would be best complemented with policy and operational reform to enhance 
the ability for UN agencies to approach non-state armed groups in an effort to 
alleviate access constraints.  
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B. Policy Reform 
Policy suggestions may include alterations in the UN’s operational effectiveness 
through streamlining policies within UN agencies so as to create a more efficient 
approach to crisis situations. It can also be supported by a culture of transparency, 
which has not been the case thus far within the UN considering the example of the 
investigations made regarding humanitarian workers sexually assaulting vulnerable 
populations in peacekeeping missions, among other examples.115 In addition, the 
culture of absolute impunity of their institutions and agencies, which the UN so 
adamantly clings to, should be completely eliminated. It seems that UN institutions 
are not held accountable for their errors and ineffectiveness as they should be. 
Preaching a culture of fairness and justice whilst providing impunity to humanitarian 
personnel and their respective institutions in an effort to lessen reputational hazards is 
hypocritical to say the least.116 This particular policy suggestion is difficult to 
implement but not impossible if other institutions were to demand justice from the 
UN using the limits of the law as their gateway for that justice. Finally, and what may 
be a realistically implementable policy reform, UN organizations should consider 
disempowering donor demands. This was briefly mentioned in the first chapter; 
however, creating a framework where donors would be subjected to the mandate of 
the organization, as opposed to state policies, would effectively expand the outreach 
of UN organizations to affected populations. It would also grant these organizations 
the freedom to implement their own needs assessments for these populations and act 
accordingly.  
From a legal perspective, and to further reinstate the importance of effectiveness 
for UN agencies, it would be highly beneficial to ensure the adherence of the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibilities of 
International Organizations.117 This would be with the intent to ensure accountability 
and transparency of international organizations as a whole. However, these provisions 
only deal with legal responsibility of organizations and do not involve issues such as 
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governance, accountability, or criminal responsibility, such as in situations of sexual 
offences.118 Therefore, it would be beneficial to revisit the articles in order to 
incorporate such concepts within legal framework. However, we are once again faced 
with the issue of binding organizations to such provisions without their consent, hence 
the reasoning behind suggesting policy reform as opposed to legal reform. 
Nevertheless, this is a suggestion worth exploring, perhaps in later research.  
Looking at reforming the conduct of non-state armed groups, the presented policy 
suggestions would be paralleled with a process of legal reform. If implemented 
correctly, this would ensure that humanitarian organizations are able to interact with 
non-state armed groups under different conditions so as to ensure that their access 
constraints on affected populations are alleviated. In an effort to close the gap 
between international law and humanitarian organizations’ interaction with non-state 
armed groups, some humanitarian agencies have recently taken it upon themselves to 
attempt to develop agreements with non-state armed groups in order to tackle the 
issue of access constraints, among other challenges that they face because of the 
groups’ lack of adherence to international principles. They have created what are 
known to be “Rules of Engagement” that are a form of code of conduct created to 
invite non-state armed groups to adhere to international principles in exchange for 
providing them with an international personality.  
C. Rules of Engagement 
The Rules of Engagement that the humanitarian community has attempted to 
implement as a form of agreement with non-state armed groups are essentially the 
principles enshrined in IHL and customary international law. These rules are 
formulated to ensure the least amount of damage caused to civilians during conflict, 
ensuring the protection of humanitarian organizations, aid, and convoys, and finally 
attempting to ensure that there is an adherence to the principles of armed conflict. The 
non-state armed groups are therefore required to uphold their agreements with 
humanitarian organizations, and in return, these organizations facilitate national and 
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international dialogues between states and non-state armed groups in order to give 
them a form of recognition in the international system.119  
 The effectiveness of these Rules, however, must be assessed in order to 
determine whether such a strategy should be incorporated within the law. It can be 
argued that the Rules have been far more effective than international law has been in 
educating non-state armed groups on the principles of IHL and customary principles. 
They have also been effective in incentivizing non-state armed groups to adhering to 
these principles by adopting a method of inclusion in international and national 
dialogues. Through these dialogues, non-state armed groups are able to voice their 
concerns to the international community and their cooperation is then reciprocated.120 
Furthermore, the monitoring bodies that administer these Rules actively perform 
investigations through their missions to assess the certain actors’ level of adherence to 
international law principles. The ICRC and Human Rights Watch are of the 
organizations that perform such missions and have attempted to improve non-state 
armed groups’ adherence to international principles in the past, including in both 
Libya and Yemen.121 
 The drawback to the implementation of the Rules of Engagement is that they 
are only effective inasmuch as states are willing to participate in the process of 
dialogue and reciprocity with non-state armed groups. While these rules may be 
effective in principle, they are highly subjective to the context in which they are 
applied. Each state will react differently to the possibility of roundtable discussions 
with a non-state armed group, specifically if that group threatens the effectiveness of 
the ruling regime in order to gain their own sovereignty.122 Agreeing to the process of 
dialogue would mean that the state is recognizing the non-state armed group and is 
entering into discussions with the group based on that recognition. Therefore, it is 
argued that the Rules could be very effective or completely ineffective depending on 
the state’s intentions towards the process.123 It is also believed that these Rules have 
not been effective because they are yet to change the reality on the ground. Some 
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scholars have the perspective of these Rules being idealistic and that because most 
states would not cooperate in such a process, the non-state armed groups would lose 
incentive towards adhering to such principles. It is argued by one scholar that this is 
precisely the reality; humanitarian organizations are continuously facing challenges 
because the state-centric system is unwilling to integrate non-state armed groups 
within the system, effectively losing all potential cooperation with the non-state 
armed group.124 Although Rules of Engagement may be effective in principle, non-
state armed groups remain in violation of their principles because of the lack of 
reciprocity of state actors.  
However, it can equally be argued that the Rules are convincing enough to have 
non-state armed groups cooperate with humanitarian organizations in order to further 
the benefits of both parties.125 Although states may not be in full cooperation as of 
yet, the involvement of humanitarian organizations to further their own interests in 
terms of fulfilling their mandate is a method of ensuring that populations in need are 
receiving their required assistance.  
There is a potential for humanitarian organizations to be granted access to NGCAs 
through such rules in the event that the state is willing to cooperate with them. This is 
taken as a method of mitigating the access constraints faced by UN agencies, as it 
seems to be the starting point for improving the legal system. The idea is to emulate 
the structure of the Rules of Engagement, which should be incorporated within the 
laws of IHL. Currently, IHL is restricted to a state-centric system that does not allow 
humanitarian agencies to engage with non-state armed groups outside the limits of the 
law. The incorporation of the Rules of Engagement within the IHL will allow for an 
expansion of that doctrine, which will have a greater effect on the mandates of 
humanitarian organizations by allowing them to extend their outreach to populations 
of besieged areas. Furthermore, applying such a structure would create a process of 
accountability whereby non-state armed groups would be bound by principles of IHL 
in exchange for being recognized as non-state armed groups with a legal personality 
that does not equate a state but should have similar rights in warfare. In addition, their 
involvement in international and regional dialogues as political actors will be a form 
of granting these rights, which may be stripped from them if violations were to occur. 
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This should provide them with incentives to adhere to the Rules. However, under the 
current state-centric structure of international law, once again, this is highly 
dependent on the state’s willingness to involve non-state armed groups in such a 
process considering the system will still maintain the importance of protecting state 
sovereignty. If this is reached, states will have a platform of discussion with non-state 
armed groups facilitated by UN agencies, which will allow for the betterment of 
access strategies in times of conflict so as to improve outreach to affected 
populations. A more effective method would be to alter the system as a whole to 
remove the idea of state-centricity in order to allow international organizations to 
bypass the state and legally recognize non-state armed groups in order to create a 
more regional involvement for these actors. However, this task would be 
exceptionally difficult, though not impossible in the long-run.   
 62 
VII. CONCLUSION 
International humanitarian law as a whole, whether it is in reference to international 
or non-international armed conflicts, has been incapable of dealing with the idea that 
non-state armed groups are an entity worth recognizing as a part of the international 
system.126 Instead, the focus of international law is on attempting to bind non-state 
armed groups to current international law principles, which has not been a successful 
strategy thus far.127 This is especially true after the events of the Arab Spring of 2011 
occurred, when an influx of non-state armed groups appeared in the Middle Eastern 
region and international law was unsuccessful in implementing a framework that 
deals with non-state armed groups as a legal entity.128 Under international law, the 
creation of non-state armed groups is not prohibited. Prohibitions against the creation 
of non-state armed groups fall under domestic law of certain states. Yet, international 
law seems to criminalize non-state armed groups without prohibiting them but have 
not yet implemented a constructive method of interacting with them. Therefore, 
relying on the current system of governance of non-state armed groups causes there to 
be a gap between the law and its implementation.  
Not only does this gap pose theoretical dilemmas in the legal sphere, but it 
also leads to obstacles faced by UN agencies in attempting to execute their operations. 
As mentioned, considering the events of the Arab Spring and their effects post-2011, 
UN agencies were necessary in providing assistance in areas where conflicts arose. 
The Middle Eastern countries used as examples to depict the challenges faced by UN 
agencies as a result of the insufficiencies of the current legal framework governing 
non-state armed groups were Yemen and Libya subsequent to the 2011 Arab Spring, 
as both consist of the presence of several non-state armed groups as parties within the 
same conflict ultimately subjecting UN agencies to several access challenges. This is 
also true in Eastern Europe where the Ukrainian civil conflict has presented 
complications for UN agencies to effectively implement their mandate. This again is 
due to the inefficiencies of the existing legal framework of IHL that governs non-state 
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armed groups’ conduct during conflict. Such inefficiencies are also a result of the 
fluctuating political dynamics of the system, whereby the UN’s ineffectiveness and 
state interests have played a major role in determining the political and legal position 
of non-state armed groups. This furthers the difficulty in treating non-state armed 
groups as an entity worth interacting with during conflict situations.  
The situation in all three conflicts is as follows: non-state armed groups are 
emerging and are becoming of great significance in the international system. Some 
non-state armed groups are seeking independence whilst others are considered 
terrorist organizations, although some may overlap. International law does not 
currently have a mechanism to qualify conflicts with the complexity of those such as 
Yemen, Libya, or Ukraine whereby the non-state armed group is strong enough to 
demand secession and the state is unable to contain it. International law is also lacking 
a mechanism for binding these non-state armed groups to the principles outlined in 
the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols or customary law. This includes ensuring 
the safety of civilians and authorizing assistance from humanitarian organizations. An 
incentive for non-state armed groups to adhere to international law principles would 
be to allow for their independence, grant them recognition, or incorporate them in a 
political decision-making process. But, the current international legal system does not 
recognize non-state armed groups as more than belligerents under the legal 
framework of an IAC.129 This perspective is important in explaining where the 
challenge lies for UN agencies to execute their operations.  
 The intent here was not to provide a new comprehensive framework for non-
state armed groups. On the contrary, through the research, a conclusion is made that 
there is simply a need to develop the current framework without having to formulate a 
new methodology of dealing with non-state armed groups. There is no need to 
completely recreate the legal framework for non-state armed groups but simply to 
improve its provisions on governing the interaction between humanitarian agencies 
and non-state armed groups. However, it must be understood that there is a need to 
reassess the way the current framework of non-state armed groups is approached. It 
must be recognized that non-state armed groups are no longer an exception to the 
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norm of international law. Their numbers and significance are becoming an integral 
part of the international system and should therefore become systemized within 
international law.130 This was also illustrated through analyzing the drawbacks of the 
absence of a comprehensive framework that have led to impediments on UN 
operations in the three conflicts. Therefore, there is a need to introduce policy and 
operational reform to the UN structure as well as state policies in order to lessen the 
impact that such dynamics have on the international legal system. More specifically, 
incorporating the Rules of Engagement doctrine, as an example, into the provisions of 
IHL would serve the creation of an explicit relationship between non-state armed 
groups and humanitarian organizations. It would bind non-state armed groups to a set 
of principles in exchange for being involved in international and regional dialogues. 
This could provide incentive for the non-state armed group to adhere to such 
principles and creates an implicit accountability mechanism that is currently 
nonexistent. If this is applied, UN agencies would be granted access to NGCAs with 
the consent of both the state and non-state actors, a process of accountability would be 
in place to ensure non-state armed groups’ adherence to IHL principles, and finally, 
affected populations would be able to receive the aid they deserve in both a 
theoretical and practical sense under IHL and human rights law.  
                                                 
130 See Weiss, Seyle, and Coolidge, supra note 43.   
